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INTRODUCTION
As more Americans consume fast food each year, more Americans
are contracting serious diseases related to obesity. Considering that
obesity ranks second behind tobacco use as the largest contributor to
mortality rates in the United States, and also that it gives rise to greater
publicly funded health care expenses than does tobacco, this
phenomenon begs the obvious question: to what extent does the growing
consumption of fast food contribute to the obesity epidemic and the
incidence of disease? If the answer indicates a meaningful contribution,
a natural follow-up question then emerges: in a sensible legal system,
what instruments would best ameliorate its effects?
In attempting to answer these questions, this Article explores
obesity as an economic occurrence, and how varying legal remedies may
curtail its deleterious effects on the American economy. In doing so,
this Article surveys the proportional causes of obesity, and it identifies
fast food consumption as an essential element. In accordance with that
finding, this Article ponders whether an absence of nutritional labeling
has precipitated overconsumption, and how the law may be optimally
utilized to minimize associated inefficiencies.
Specifically, Part I appraises the primary determinants of obesity in
the United States, as well as whether Americans knowingly contribute to
their corpulence. This is an essential examination, since obesity has
morphed into a material public expense, with taxpayers now bearing
approximately half of the cost of the nation's girth. Through this
analysis, Part I confirms the predictable: most Americans already know
that fast food consumption may impair their health. Yet, more
engagingly, it also reveals that Americans often underestimate the extent
of that impairment, in part because they tend to discount the negative
contents of restaurant food. Accordingly, many Americans internalize a
degree of risk less significant than the actual risk present, thus rendering
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their food decision-making process systematically optimistic. This is
particularly evident among children, who prove uniquely sanguine.
Part II then scrutinizes federal governmental choices when
imposing food labeling requirements, as well as the extent of regulatory
authority that has been delegated to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Significantly, the federal government has exempted all
restaurants from food labeling requirements. The merits of such a
privilege bear query, since any exemption from product labeling
presumes that consumers engage in a rational assessment of associated
risks.
As explored in Part III, however, other relevant actors, such as the
State of New York, have concluded otherwise, specifically that
consumers often fail to engage in such rational assessment. While
adhering to the confines of the federal labeling exemption, these actors
have consummated voluntary agreements with fast food companies with
the hope of efficiently engineering market incentives for nutritional
disclosure. Similarly, certain industry participants, by offering
"healthy" dishes, may implicitly signal the less nourishing content of
their regular dishes. Thus, in order to fully evaluate the efficacy of the
labeling exemption, the supplemental value of these existing and
voluntary market influences must also be considered.
Part IV turns to the emerging, though largely quixotic, judicial
remedies for Americans who have contracted obesity-related diseases,
allegedly due to fast food consumption. Though such lawsuits have
been dismissed as trivial by most commentators, they present an
excellent vehicle for examining the comparative merits of prospective
regulation and retrospective litigation. That is, they suggest something
of a recurring miss: a discrete group of individuals appears uniquely
inclined to overconsume fast food, thus intimating a traditional common
law duty on the part of fast food companies to warn; yet, for purposes of
establishing legal causation, identifying and quantifying the proportional
causes for any one person's obesity and obesity-related disease proves
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Thus, such lawsuits
continuously fail to satisfy the requisite contours of a tort claim, even
though they raise meritorious concerns for social scientists and
policymakers alike.
By applying consumer choice theory to fast food consumption, Part
V proposes a new theoretical framework that could both conceive a
limited common law duty to warn of the dangers of overconsumption
and, by immunizing a food seller from tort liability, reward compliance
with such a duty. Specifically, this Article postulates revision of the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 ("NLEA") to require the
divulgence of nutritional information for all fast food items marketed for
childhood consumption. In this narrowly tailored setting, the food
2004: 1161 1163
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
decision-making process appears both uniquely optimistic and capable of
correction, as parents often dictate or significantly influence the food
consumption of their children. In that particular decision-making
process, parents internalize an anomalously high value in nutrition and
diminished tolerance of risk. Moreover, the imposition of a targeted
nutritional labeling requirement would prove strikingly less onerous than
more regressive and costly measures, such as an "obesity tax" or a "fast
food tax." In short, this form of nutritional labeling would prove
uniquely efficacious. Accordingly, regulatory and judicial alternatives
may be combined to most efficiently curtail the effects of fast food
overconsumption on public health and tax-funded expenditures, while
simultaneously removing from the American tort system a legally
implausible, though factually credible, claim.
1. OBESITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Corpulence and National Health
A discussion of obesity in the United States must begin with the
obvious: most Americans are fat. Specifically, over 100 million
Americans, or 60% of the adult population, are overweight, with 20%
of the population classified as "obese," or more than 20% above their
ideal body weight.' Of those obese, approximately 90% are "mildly
obese," or 20% to 40% above their ideal body weight;2 9% are
"moderately obese," or 41% to 100% above their ideal body weight;3
and 2% are "morbidly obese" or over 100% above their ideal body
weight.4
More troubling, Americans are only becoming heavier. In fact, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that the
1. See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among
U.S. Adults, 1999-2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1726 (2002); see also Roland Sturm et al.,
Increasing Obesity Rates and Disability Trends, 23 HEALTH AFF. 199, 205 (2004)
(confirming contemporary accuracy of 2002 data).
2. Flegal et al., supra note 1, at 1726 (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL HEALTH AND NUTRITION
EXAMINATION SURVEY 70 (2002)); see also Jane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25,
28-29 (1997) (providing historical analysis of obesity statistics).
3. Korn, supra note 2, at 29.
4. See Pamela L. Horn-Ross et al., Phytoestrogen Intake and Endometrial
Cancer Risk, 95 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 1158, 1160 (2003) (defining "morbidly
obese"); Richard Perez-Pena & Grant Glickson, As Obesity Rises, Health Care
Indignities Multiply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2003, at Al (supplying supplemental data,
as well as application of data to health care trends). But see Korn, supra note 2, at 28-
29 (stating that 0.5% of Americans are morbidly obese).
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percentage of obese Americans rose a startling 70% from 1991 to 2001 .'
Other studies confirm this trend. For instance, the American Medical
Association posits that the cumulative number of obese Americans
nearly doubled during the 1990s, 6 while the Joslin Diabetes Center
concludes that adult men and women are eight pounds heavier today
than they were in 1986.'
Paradoxically, Americans have only become heavier while
antiobesity warnings have intensified. Indeed, the dangers of obesity
have been known for over a half-century. In 1952, the American Heart
Association identified excess weight as a cardiac risk factor modifiable
through diet and exercise.' Since that time, numerous published studies
have found that obesity correlates with the increased prevalence of
several grievous ailments, including gallbladder disease, high blood
pressure, coronary heart disease, and, most often, Type 2 diabetes. 9
Obesity may also inflict severe emotional harm, such as social
stigmatization, depression, and poor body image."0 Also, the FDA
5. See Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Ctrs.
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1991-2001 Prevalence of Obesity Among U.S.
Adults, by Characteristics, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/prevchar.htm (last updated Apr. 22,
2003).
6. See Flegal, supra note 1, at 1726.
7. See Joslin Diabetes Center, Why Is Obesity a Growing Problem in
America? (citing comments by Dr. Christopher Kollar, a specialist in bariatric surgery
or "stomach-stapling," who finds that the average American is fifteen pounds heavier
today than in 1993), at http://www.joslin.harvard.edu/news/obesityO2.shtml (Aug.
2001); see also Amy H. Berger, Marvel's in Medicine, 29 N.J. MONTHLY 83, 98 (2004)
(citing Dr. Kollar as well). Also consider data from the 1976-1980 and 1988-1994
National Health and Nutrition Examination surveys, which reveal the prevalence of the
overweight increased from 25% to 35% among American adults. See Marion Nestle &
Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic: A Public Health Policy Approach,
115 PUB. HEALTH REP. 12, 16 (2000).
8. See HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, DEP'T OF NUTRITION, FOOD FOR
YOUR HEART: A MANUAL FOR PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN (1952).
9. See generally Ross E. Andersen et al., Relationship Between Body Weight
Gain and Significant Knee, Hip, and Back Pain in Older Americans, 11 OBESITY RES.
1159 (2003) (studying effect of weight gain on accelerated deterioration of body parts);
James W. Anderson et al., Importance of Weight Management in Type 2 Diabetes:
Review with Meta-Analysis of Clinical Studies, 22 J. AM. C. NUTRITION 331 (2003)
[hereinafter Anderson et al., Weight Management] (explaining the effect of obesity on
Type 2 diabetes); David S. Freedman et al., The Relation of Overweight to
Cardiovascular Risk Factors Among Children and Adolescents: The Bogalusa Heart
Study, 103 PEDIATRICS 1175, 1175 (1999) (studying the cardiovascular risks from
obesity).
10. For a comprehensive discussion on the personal costs of obesity, see Sarah
Mustillo et al., Obesity and Psychiatric Disorder: Developmental Trajectories, 111
PEDIATRICS 851 (2003). See also Comm. on Nutrition, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Prevention of Pediatric Overweight and Obesity, 112 PEDIATRICS 424, 425 (2003) ("The
2004:1161 1165
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actively promotes moderated consumption of calories and fat in order to
reduce the risk of excess weight and disease."
Predictably, as more Americans become obese, more Americans
contract obesity-related diseases. 2 Less anticipated is the ease at which
such diseases may emerge. This is readily observable in Type 2
diabetes, which can be triggered by an excess of only ten pounds, and
which has risen in incidence by 33 % over the past ten years.' 3 More
alarming, Americans are contracting Type 2 diabetes and similar
obesity-related diseases at earlier ages, thus adversely affecting their
long-term health outlook. 4 In fact, the incidence of juvenile diabetes
has increased tenfold over the past twenty years,' 5 and one in three U.S.
children born in 2000 will likely become diabetic.' 6 Aggregate figures
are even less promising, as it is estimated that between 285,000 and
325,000 Americans die each year due to obesity,' 7 and obese Americans
live, on average, a decade less than their healthy counterparts.
18
psychologic stress of social stigmatization imposed on obese children may be just as
damaging as the medical morbidities. The negative images of obesity are so strong that
growth failure and pubertal delay have been reported in children practicing self-imposed
caloric restriction because of fears of becoming obese."); Kom, supra note 2, at 26-28
(supplying further insight on the link between obesity and depression).
11. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends that fat intake not
exceed 30% of the total daily intake of calories, and that the average person consume
between 2,000 and 2,500 calories and sixty-five grams of fat daily. See infra notes 66-
67 and accompanying text.
12. See Comm. on Nutrition, supra note 10, at 424 (detailing need correlation
between necessity for preventative behavior and obesity-related diseases); Sturm, supra
note 1, at 199 (exploring increase in obesity-related diseases). See generally supra note
9 and accompanying text.
13. See Joslin Diabetes Center, supra note 7. This increase in the incidence of
Type 2 diabetes is particularly evident among obese men under fifty-five, who are eight
to eighteen times more likely to have Type 2 diabetes than men who are of normal
weight. Id.
14. See Anderson et al., Weight Management, supra note 9, at 331-32. See
generally Alexander R. Green, The Human Face of Health Disparities, 118 PuB.
HEALTH REP. 303, 303 (2003) (discussing effects of diabetes and other diseases on the
long-term health of different racial groups).
15. See Rinker Buck, Legal Battleground: Girth of a Nation, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 13, 2003, at Al (quoting John F. Banzhaf, Professor of Law at George
Washington University). See generally Christine J. Macaluso et al., Type 2 Diabetes
Mellitus Among Florida Children and Adolescents, 1994 Through 1998, 117 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 373 (2002) (providing study which found that increasing obesity strongly
correlates with surging rates in Type 2 diabetes among children ages five to nineteen).
16. Health Newswire Reporters, Diabetes Threatens U.S. Children, HEALTH
MEDIA GROUP, June 16, 2003.
17. Of Remarks by Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman at the 2003 Farm
Journal Forum, REG. INTELLIGENCE DATA, Dec. 4, 2003; Katherine Tallmadge, Eat
Less, Live Longer?, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at Fl.
18. See Ann M. Coulston, Obesity: New Bad News on Eating Patterns, Liver
Disease, and Shortened Life, 38 NtrrTmoN TODAY 238, 240-41 (2003).
Nutritional Labeling
Perhaps most vividly, obesity ranks second behind tobacco use as the
largest contributor to mortality rates in the United States. 9
B. Taxpayer Absorption of Obesity
Associated with the rise in obesity and obesity-precipitated disease
are the medical costs of treatment. For obese people, their excess
weight increases annual medical expenses by approximately 37%,
including more medication, physician visits, and hospitalizations.'
Furthermore, obesity and obesity-related diseases may adversely impact
employment opportunities and professional advancement. 2'
The cumulative societal costs of obesity are even more staggering.
The U.S. Surgeon General's Office estimates that, in terms of lost work
and medical expenditures, obesity costs $117 billion annually, 22 or $42
billion more per year than tobacco. 23 This figure also represents 10% of
total medical spending.24  Likewise, rising obesity contributes
significantly to costs associated with treatment for obesity-precipitated
diseases. For instance, the annual cost of diabetes is now assessed at
19. See Jeffrey P. Koplan & William H. Dietz, Caloric Imbalance and Public
Health Policy, 282 JAMA 1579, 1579 (1999).
20. JENNIFER NEISNER ET AL., BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 5 (Kaiser Permanente Care Mgmt. Inst.,
Prepared for the Roundtable: "Prevention and Treatment of Overweight and Obesity:
Toward a Roadmap for Advocacy and Action," 2003).
21. See Richard A. Posthuma et al., Beyond Employment Interview Validity: A
Comprehensive Narrative Review of Recent Research and Trends over lime, 55
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 23 (2002) (noting that "[a]pplicant obesity had a negative
influence on perceptions of personality traits and explained 35 % of the variance in hiring
decisions"); see also Carey Goldberg, Fat People Say an Intolerant World Condemns
Them on First Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at 36 (noting that highly obese women
earn 24% less while the moderately obese earn about 6% less). See generally Theresa
Johnson & Mary C. Wilson, An Analysis of Weight-Based Discrimination: Obesity as a
Disability, 46 LAB. L.J. 238 (1995) (exploring the issue of weight-related
discrimination); Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of Weight Discrimination in
Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2002) (arguing for weight-based antidiscrimination
protection).
22. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 10 (2001), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topic/obesity/.
23. See Erin Duggan, Tobacco-Suit Tactics Now Target Fast Food, TIMES
UNION, Apr. 6, 2003, at At. For an illuminating discussion of the economic costs of
tobacco, see generally Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998).
24. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, New Report
Highlights U.S. Medical Costs of Injuries (Jan. 15, 2004) (concluding that $117 billion




$132 billion and that amount will likely surge to over $1 trillion by
2025.5
Equally startling, slightly more than half of these costs are absorbed
by taxpayers, who pay about 60% of the $75 billion national health bill
added by the overweight and obese.2 Another way of looking at this
$75 billion figure is that the average American taxpayer is annually
assessed a $162 obesity tax." Approximately half of these taxpayer
expenditures are funneled through Medicare and Medicaid programs,28
while much of the remaining burden is absorbed by employers, who pay
an average annual cost of $8,720 per employee for obesity-related
disabilities.29
Consequently, while obese Americans may incur direct harm
through fast food consumption, health-conscious citizens, businesses,
and employers are picking up the tab. This is especially true since
among the population, economically disadvantaged Americans are most
likely to be classified as overweight or obese, as an inverse relationship
exists between weight and socioeconomic status, as well as fitness and
socioeconomic status.'
25. Garret Condon, Diabetes Epidemic Menaces the U.S.; Costs, Suffering
Expected to Soar, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 9, 2001, at Al; Nat'l Ctr. For Chronic
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Diabetes: A Serious Public Health Problem,
at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphplbbdiabetes/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
26. Obesity: American Taxes Pay for Most Obesity Health Ills According to
Study, L. & HEALTH WKLY., Feb. 21, 2004, at 175. For a study of obesity's effect on
state budgets, see James Maxwell et al., Private Health Purchasing Practices in the
Public Sector: A Comparison of State Employers and the Fortune 500, 23 HEALTH AFF.
182 (2004).
27. This figure was calculated as follows: as of July 1, 2003, there were
290,809,777 Americans. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Briefing National Population
Estimates for July 1, 2003, at http://www.census.gov/popestlnational/popbriefing.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). Eighty-three percent of Americans pay taxes. The "Hyde-
Woolsey" Child Support Bill: Hearing on H.R. 1488 Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 106-07 (2000) (statement of Geraldine Jensen, President,
Ass'n for Children for Enforcement and Support, Inc.). Thus, approximately
241,372,114 Americans pay taxes. Since taxpayers pay $39 trillion for the cost of
obesity, the average American pays $161.58.
28. Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion,
Overweight and Obesity: Economic Consequences, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/ecomomic-consequences.htm (last updated
June 24, 2004). Note that Medicare and Medicaid cover sicknesses caused by obesity
including Type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, several types of cancer, and
gallbladder disease. Id.
29. Report Shows Tenfold Increase in Obesity-Related Disability Claims,
HEALTH & MED. WK., Mar. 15, 2004, at 641.
30. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Health Disparities and the Law: Wrongs in
Search of a Right, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 379 (2003) (explaining correlation between
wealth and obesity); see also Stephen L. Buka, Disparities in Health Status and
Substance Use: Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Factors, 117 PuB. HEALTH REP. 118, 120-
1168
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C. Explaining Obesity
Given the exorbitant public cost of obesity, taxpayers of all sizes
may rightfully ask: why are Americans so fat? And why are they
getting fatter? Since gaining weight is simply the result of consuming
more calories than are burned, several specific and undoubtedly related
explanations arise.
First, most Americans fail to exercise regularly. Although gym
memberships have risen steadily in recent years, only 10% of
Americans belong to a gym, 3' only 3% exercise sixty minutes or more a
day,32 and less than one in five claims to exercise three or more times a
week. Moreover, to the extent Americans exercise, they tend to
partake in relatively low-intensity activities, such as walking or light
weightlifting .3 Income may also affect exercise regimen, as those in
higher income brackets tend to exercise more often than those in lower
brackets.35
21 (Supp. 1 2002) (noting correlation between wealth and fitness); Chris Power et al.,
The Duration and Timing of Exposure: Effects of Socioeconomic Environment on Adult
Health, 89 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1059, 1062 (1999) (finding that exposure to
socioeconomic disadvantage both in early life and in adult life increases the chances of
poor health in adulthood).
31. See Innovative Weight Management System Tackles the U.S. Fat Epidemic;
Safe, Natural System Restores Metabolism While Cleansing the Body of Harmful Toxins,
PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 12, 2003.
32. Suz Redfearn, Take a Walk, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2002, at F6; see also
Office of the Surgeon Gen., supra note 22, at 2 (noting that 40% of adults in the United
States do not participate in any leisure-time physical activity).
33. See Patricia M. Barnes et al., Physical Activity Among Adults: United
States, 2000, 333 ADVANCED DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 1, 19-20
(2003) (presenting a study which finds that only 19% of adults exercise three or more
times a week); see also Judy Putnam, U.S. Food Supply Providing More Food and
Calories, 22 FOOD REV. 2, 2 (1999) ("More than 60 percent of American adults are not
regularly physically active, and 25 percent of adults are not active at all.").
34. See Overweight Americans: Need More Exercise, CDC Says, AM. HEALTH
LINE, Apr. 21, 2000 (noting that the average overweight person exercises usually by
walking). However, this is not to argue that walking or other low-intensity exercises are
without value. Indeed, if an averaged-sized woman walked fifteen minutes a day and
consumed between 2,000 and 2,500 calories a day, she would lose approximately ten
pounds in a year. See Richard B. Parr, Exercising When You're Overweight: Getting in
Shape and Shedding Pounds, 24 PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MEDICINE 81, 81 (1996).
35. See Maritz Research, Let's Get Physical: More than Half of Americans
Claim to Exercise Regularly at
http://www.maritzresearch.com/release.asp?rc = 189&p =l&T=P (Feb. 2002) ("Income
also plays a part in who chooses to exercise. Sixty percent of respondents making more
than $45,000 per year exercise regularly, compared to 48 percent of those who earn
less.").
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Similarly, an increasing proportion of Americans has embraced
sedentary lifestyles. Indeed, Americans now leave little time for
exercise after spending most of the day sleeping, working, watching
television or surfing the Internet-activities which generally expend few
calories. 6  These lifestyles in part reflect a demanding society (for
example, Americans work an average of nearly 2,000 hours per year),37
and in part captivating leisure choices (for example, Americans spend an
average of three hours per day surfing the Internet and four hours
watching television)."
Perhaps not surprisingly then, most Americans encounter
significant difficulty losing weight, thus further explaining obesity in
America. As a matter of fact, it is estimated that more than 90% of
those who diet gain back each pound they had lost.39 Moreover, despite
the apparent popularity of new diets, such as the "Atkins Diet" or the
"South Beach Diet," Americans are actually dieting less frequently now
than in the past, with the percentage of dieting Americans dropping from
20% to 16% between 1986 and 1996.'o If this trend continues, twenty
million Americans will be dieting in 2007, or four million fewer than in
1997.4'
36. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE
UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 151 (1991) (noting that such solutions run the risk of
reproducing gender inequality unless women's roles change within the family); Scott D.
Miller, The Fair Labor Standards Act: Work/Life Balance and the White-Collar Employee
Under the FLSA, 7 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYER POL'Y J. 5 (2003) (examining and
proposing amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act).
37. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, All Work and No Play, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 8, 2003, at 86; see also Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work- Unions as Seedbeds
of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 280 (1995) (describing how the normal American
work week has increased to the point where the average employee now works the equivalent
of an additional month more than was worked in 1970).
38. See Charles Geraci, Bush Camp Unveils Ads on Newspaper Web Sites,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER (May 24, 2004) (stating that American women spend 3.3 hours per
day on the Internet), at
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article -display.jsp?vnu-content-id = 10
00517532; see also Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the
Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and
More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 190 n.81 (2003) (noting that the
average American spends four hours a day watching television).
39. Joslin Diabetes Center, supra note 7.
40. Shannon Dortch, America Weighs In, 19 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 39, 43
(1997). Along these lines, many weight loss and fitness companies are struggling
financially. For instance, Weight Watchers International Inc. cut its 2003 profit forecast
in August 2003; NutriSystem Inc. saw its revenue decline by 11 % in the first nine
months of last year; and Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., owner of 420 health clubs,
saw its membership revenue fall 7%, and its profits fall 84%, during the first nine
months of 2003 when compared to the same period in 2002. Naomi Aoki, No Carbs for
You!, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2004, at HI.
41. See Dortch, supra note 40, at 45.
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Though most Americans expend little effort to consciously bum
existing calories, many go to great lengths to add new ones. In truth,
Americans are eating more than ever before. Specifically, the average
caloric intake has risen 18% in the last thirty years,42 representing
roughly 530 additional calories per day."
Part of the rise in caloric consumption pertains to food choice, as
Americans have increasingly turned to food options outside the home,
such as restaurant or diner food. In point of fact, Americans now spend
half of their food budget and consume one-third of their daily energy on
meals and drinks consumed outside the home, the latter figure
representing an 80% increase from 1977.' On average, those foods
contain more fat and fewer nutrients than food cooked at home.45
When Americans choose food outside the home, they most often
select fast food, which offers the largest and most fattening servings.
46
Indeed, as it is often said, Americans love fast food.47  More
interestingly, it can also be said that the love affair only strengthens as
the years pass. To illustrate, consider that fast food industry sales have
grown from 25% to 50% of all restaurant sales since 1970.48 Or,
42. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report: Trends in Intake of Energy and Macronutrients-United States, 1971-2000 at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5304a3.htm (Feb. 6, 2004) (noting
that the average caloric intake reported by Americans rose from 1826 kilocalories per
day from 1977 to 1978 to 1974 kilocalories per day from 1989 to 1991, and to 2002
kilocalories per day from 1994 to 1996); see also Dortch, supra note 40, at 41.
43. For a better sense of these figures, consider that 530 calories is roughly
equivalent to 2.5 cups of cooked pasta. Christine Gorman, How to Eat Smarter, TIME,
Oct. 20, 2003, at 52.
44. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 461 (1997); see also
Putnam, supra note 33, at 3. A similar finding was observed by the Institute of
Medicine in 1990, when it discovered that Americans expend roughly 43% of their food
dollars on meals outside the home. Marlene Cimons, Nutrition Labels for Fresh Foods,
Restaurants Urged, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1990, at A23 (quoting Professor Richard A.
Merrill, chairman of the study conducted by the Institute of Medicine).
45. Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 19.
46. See John Burklow & Amy Aubertin, Fast Food Chains Move Toward
Healthier Choices, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 325, 325 (1991) (noting that "[flast food
represents the largest component of eating place sales, with expected sales of $74.1
billion in 1991"); see also Shanthy A. Bowman et al., Effects of Fast-Food Consumption
on Energy Intake and Diet Quality Among Children in a National Household Survey, 113
PEDIATRICS 112, 112 (2004) (identifying fast food consumption among children as a
factor in the expansion of obesity). But see TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, BURGERS, FRIES AND LAWYERS: THE BEEF BEHIND OBESITY LAWSUITS 3
(2003) (concluding that there is "little conclusive evidence that [fast food] is a primary
cause of obesity"), available at http://66.241.235.56/resources/burgers.pdf.
47. For a thorough account of the popularity of fast food in America, see
generally ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION (2002).
48. Scott Allen, The Greening of McDonald's: Environmental Houdini Act
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consider that Americans now spend $110 billion annually on fast food
items,49 compared with $50 billion spent on seafood,50 and $60 billion
spent on fruits and vegetables, combined.5' Or, consider that 25% of
Americans eat fast food daily,52 and the average American consumes
two fast food meals a week.53 None of this should come as a surprise,
however, since there are almost 250,000 fast food restaurants in the
United States,' or roughly one for every 1,200 Americans. 55
The growth of fast food consumption is also evidenced by the
increase in advertising and promotional resources expended by the fast
food industry. 6 In fact, it is estimated that the industry spends $33
Transforms Chain from Rogue to Role Model, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2000, at Cl; see
also Sahasporn Paeratakul et al., Fast-Food Consumption Among US Adults and
Children: Dietary and Nutrient Intake Profile, 103 J. AM. DIETETIc ASS'N 1332, 1332
(noting that fast food sales increased 300% from 1970 to 1980).
49. Joel Iglesias, Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
to Franchises, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1423, 1430 (2004).
50. FoodMarketExchange.com, Shrimp Consumption: USA, at
http://www.foodmarketexchange.com/datacenterproduct/seafood/shrimp/detaildc-pi-sf
_shrimp07Ol011.htm (1999) (citing research conducted by the National Fisheries
Institute).
51. See Press Release, Glad, Waste Watchers: What We Eat and What We
Pitch (Nov. 2001) (citing research conducted by Dr. William Rathje that states
"Americans spend $60 billion annually on fresh produce"), available at
http://www.glad.com/media_9.html.
52. Davide Dukcevich, Most Influential Businessmen: Ray Kroc, at
http://www.forbes.com/2004/O3/15/cx-dd-mibp_0315krocpoll_print.html (Mar. 15,
2004).
53. Pamela Griner Leavy, In a Hurry? Fast Food Can Fit into Your Diet, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at 4; see also Sharada Shankar & Ann Klassen,
Influences on Fruit and Vegetable Procurement and Consumption Among Urban African-
American Public Housing Residents, and Potential Strategies for Intervention, 13 FAM.
ECON. & NUTRITION REV. 34 (2001) (presenting study which found that 55% of African-
American families consume fast food each week). Anecdotally, consider that the per
capita consumption of french fries now surpasses fresh potatoes, and that the average
American consumes twice as much cheese as twenty years earlier. Dortch, supra note
40, at 42. Also, consider that "average annual consumption of cheese (excluding full-
skim American and cottage, pot, and baker's cheeses) increased 269% between the
1950's and 1998." Putnam, supra note 33, at 7.
54. Bowman et al., supra note 46, at 112 (noting that as of January 2004, there
were 247,115 fast food restaurants in the United States).
55. There were 290,809,777 Americans on July 1, 2003. Census Bureau,
supra note 27. There are 247,115 fast food restaurants in the United States. Bowman et
al., supra note 46, at 112. Thus, for each American, there are 1,177 fast food
restaurants. To further illustrate this point, consider that most Americans live within
three miles of a McDonald's. Allen, supra note 48, at C1.
56. The enlarged American food supply-which provides a daily average of
3,800 calories for every American, thus significantly exceeding the FDA's suggested
intake range of 2,000 to 2,500 calories a day-likely contributes to intense competition
among market participants of the fast food industry. See Anthony E. Gallo, The Food
Marketing System in 1996, 743 U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. INFO. BULL. 1, 8-9 (1998).
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billion annually on advertising, trade shows, supermarket slotting fees,
incentives, and other consumer promotions. 7 In striking contrast, the
National Cancer Institute outlays only $1 million per year to avail the
benefits of fruits and vegetables, 8 while the National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute's National Cholesterol Education Campaign possesses a
seemingly meager budget of $1.5 million. 9 Perhaps most illustrative,
"[olnly 2% of all food advertising is devoted to the promotion of fruits,
vegetables, grains, or beans."'
Fast food's remarkable currency with the American people has
generated a number of explanations. For instance, fast food may
provide a "self-medication" to those who are depressed, lonely or
angry.6 Fast food may also serve as a befitting companion to the
burgeoning group of Americans who frequently watch television or surf
the Internet.62 Perhaps most practically, fast food offers a large amount
of food for a very inexpensive price. Indeed, a recent study found that
over 75% of fast food eaters "believe they're getting good value for
their money.',
63
Aside from frequenting fast food restaurants more often, Americans
are also eating more when they visit, particularly with the advent of
"super sizing" and "value meals." In almost every fast food restaurant,
a patron can opt for a value meal, which typically includes a hamburger
sandwich, a side order of french fries, and a soft drink at a discounted
price; in contrast, super sizing simply refers to enlarged versions of a
regular dish. Roughly one-half of fast food orders are, in fact, value
meals.' Sometimes super sizing and value meals are combined to
produce a remarkably hearty meal. For instance, a McDonald's patron
can purchase the "super-sized Big Mac value meal," which includes a
57. Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 18.
58. Id. Moreover, the National Institutes of Health Five-A-Day Program,
which promotes fruit and vegetable consumption, possesses a mere $3 million budget.
Neal D. Barnard, Big Food's Greasy Secrets, N.J. L.J, Feb. 10, 2003, at 23.
59. See James I. Cleeman & Claude Lenfant, The National Cholesterol
Education Program: Progress and Prospects, 280 JAMA 2099, 2102 (1998).
60. See Barnard, supra note 58, at 23.
61. See Joslin Diabetes Center, supra note 7. For an extensive analysis of the
link between eating habits and depression, see Linda Jonides et al., Management of
Child and Adolescent Obesity: Psychological, Emotional, and Behavioral Assessment,
110 PEDIATRICS 215 (2002). See also Mustillo et al., supra note 10 (providing study on
link between youth, depression, and obesity).
62. See Joslin Diabetes Center, supra note 7; see also Patrick M. Garry, The
First Amendment in a lime of Media Proliferation: Does Freedom of Speech Entail a
Private Right to Censor?, 65 U. PiTT. L. REV. 183, 221 (2004) (noting that Internet
terminals have become available in fast food restaurants).
63. Allen, supra note 48, at Cl (citing study by the National Restaurant




hamburger sandwich, a large order of french fries, and a large soft
drink. This meal contains 1430 calories and fifty-eight grams of fat.65
To place these figures in perspective, the FDA, in the interests of
reducing the risk of disease and maintaining good health, presently
recommends that fat intake not exceed 30% of the total daily
consumption of calories,66 and that the average-sized person consume
between 2,000 and 2,500 calories and sixty-five grams of fat daily.67
According to several market studies, Americans are uniquely
attracted to value meals because they are obsessed with obtaining the
largest portion size for their food dollar.68 Moreover, for Americans on
limited budgets, obtaining significantly more food in exchange for a
minimal increase in price proves especially attractive. 69 This attraction
65. McDonald's Corp., McDonald's USA Nutrition Facts for Popular Menu
Items, at
http:Ilwww.mcdonalds.com/app controller.nutrition.categories.nutrition. index.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2004); see also McDonald's Corp., McDonald's Nutritional
Information, at http://www.app.mcdonalds.com/bagamcmeal?process =flash (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004) (allowing a consumer to calculate the total calories and fat for a Big Mac
sandwich, large order of french fries, and large Cocoa-Cola Classic drink). Similarly
plentiful, Burger King offers the Double Whopper with Cheese combo, containing two
burgers on one bun, a medium order of fries, and a soft drink. For the Burger King
patron who selects this option, he will receive the "value" of 1650 calories and eighty-
seven grams of fat. Burger King Corp., Burger King Nutritional Facts, at
http://www.burgerking.com/Food/Nutrition/NutritionWizard/index.aspx (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004) (allowing a consumer to calculate the total calories and fat for a Double
Whopper with Cheese, medium order of french fries, and medium Cocoa-Cola Classic
drink).
66. Health Claims: Fruits and Vegetables and Cancer, 21 C.F.R. § 101.78
(2004). The FDA recently issued a guidebook on interpretation of the FDA's
recommendations. See FDA, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION,
GUIDANCE ON HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND USE THE NUTRITION FACTS PANEL ON FOOD
LABELS (2003), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/- acrobat/foodlab.pdf.
67. See Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d)(9)(i)-(ii). The FDA
has also promulgated instructions to synthesize the legislation. See, e.g., Paula
Kurtzweil, 'Daily Values' Encourage Healthy Diet, 27 FDA CONSUMER 28, 31 (1993),
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/foodlabel/dvs.html; Etta Saltos, The Food-
Pyramid Label Connection, 27 FDA CONSUMER 17, 17-21 (1993), available at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/- dms/fdpyrmid.html.
68. See, e.g., Joslin Diabetes Center, supra note 7. Dr. Eleftheria Maratos-
Flier of the Joslin Diabetes Center has stated: "People feel they have to eat a lot to get
their money's worth. For an extra 5 cents, they want to upgrade to the larger
size ... [otherwise, they feel they are] getting ripped off." Id. Perhaps it is not
surprising then that 67 % of fast food patrons claim to finish their dish either most of the
time or always, regardless of the amount served. See Barbara J. Rolls, The Supersizing
of America: Portion Size and the Obesity Epidemic, 38 NUTRITION TODAY 42, 46 (2003).
69. See Joan Raymond, The Need for Speed: What Consumers Really Want
from Fast and Convenient Food, 21 FORECAST 7, 7-8 (2001) (examining a study by the
Food Marketing Institute that found fast food patrons are especially attracted to value
meals in light of incremental increase in cost).
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has certainly benefited the fast food industry, as almost every fast food
menu now features an assortment of "value" options."
As will be explored in this Article, however, while value meals
may save individual customers "some change at the counter," they
likewise exacerbate a national obesity epidemic, and cost taxpayers and
employers billions of dollars in health care and lost productivity.7
D. Theory of Consumer Choice and Its Application to Food Selection
An obvious question regarding the link between fast food
consumption and poor health pertains to consumer awareness of the
food's content, and whether the consumer knowingly chooses to
consume relatively unhealthy food. In one respect, fast food patrons
appear largely cognizant that consumption of fast food may ultimately
harm them: in a 1988 study, 60% of fast food patrons claimed that they
were "worried" about the content of such food, and only 4% felt that its
consumption was "good for them";72 yet, since that time, fast food sales
have only surged.73 A 2003 study only echoes these findings, as 75% of
American adults acknowledged "awareness that most fast food is not
good for them." 74 Other studies conclude that most Americans willingly
eat whatever pleases them, regardless of nutritional content, 75 and
regardless of recognition that fat and cholesterol intake may lead to
serious health problems.76
70. One study, in fact, confirms that super sizing and value meals are uniquely
profitable, as the ninety-nine cent large sandwich often lures customers, but those
customers usually spend up to $3.99 more for the "value meal." See Nancy Kushner,
Don't Let Fast Food Weigh You Down, PLAIN DEALER, May 24, 1999, at IF (citing
Dennis Lombardi, executive vice president of Technomic Inc., a food service consulting
firm).
71. See The Obesity Crisis in America: Hearing on Child Nutrition Programs
Before the House Subcomm. on Educ. Reform of the House Comm. on Educ. and the
Workforce, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Richard H. Carmona, U.S. Surgeon
General) ("While extra-value meals may save us some change at the counter, they're
costing us billions of dollars in health care and lost productivity."), LEXIS, Federal
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony.
72. See Allen, supra note 48, at CI.
73. See supra Part I.C.
74. See Lydia Saad, Public Balks at Obesity Lawsuits, GALLUP POLL NEws,
July 21, 2003, available at http://www.gallup.com/content/login.aspx?ci=8869.
75. See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 69, at 7 (highlighting research that fast
food patrons tend to place little value in nutritional content); Dortch, supra note 40, at
45 (noting a statistical trend that Americans increasingly "eat whatever they want").
76. See Jayachandran N. Variyam, Role of Demographics, Knowledge, and
Attitudes, in AMERICA'S EATING HABITS: CHANGES & CONSEQUENCES, 750 U.S. DEP'T
AGRIC. INFO. BULL. 281, 287 (1999) (citing data that more Americans know that high fat




Naturally, if fast food patrons perceive that they may become obese
by eating fast food, and yet they still consume such food, it suggests that
the product itself possesses certain undeterrable qualities. That is, such
patrons may systematically underestimate the risks posed by the
product.77 Meaningfully, in such a setting, it is conceptually difficult for
the law to provide consumers with incentives to take precautions,
outside of prohibiting excessive activity levels, since those consumers
internalize and accept the risk as part of the cost of using the product.78
This type of consumer behavior is often associated with cigarette
smokers, as despite prolific and remarkably dire warnings, a certain
percentage of the adult population continues to regularly engage in such
"risky" behavior.79
Unlike modem cigarette smokers, however, fast food patrons
consistently underestimate the extent to which consumption of fast food
may harm them, in part because they habitually discount the negative
health contents of the food they eat. According to separate studies
commissioned by New York University and the University of
Mississippi, Americans tend to underestimate the caloric content of
restaurant food by approximately 55%. 80  Additionally, with the
proliferation of "super sizing" and enlarged portions, the gap between
perception and reality of nutritional content only grows.8l As a result,
the typical fast food patron internalizes a degree of risk appreciably less
significant than the actual risk present.
Another way of observing this systematic underestimation of risk is
to consider that when individuals rely on false premises in purchasing
77. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 23, at 1175-76 (explaining qualities that
cannot be deterred in the context of cigarette consumption).
78. Id. at 1175.
79. It is acknowledged that a certain percentage of smokers may wish to quit
but may be unable to due to the addictive qualities of nicotine. Id. at 1195-96.
80. MARGO G. WOOTAN, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, ANYONE'S
GuEss: THE NEED FOR NUTRITION LABELING OF FAST-FOOD AND OTHER CHAIN
RESTAURANTS (2003) (noting that Americans underestimate the caloric content of
restaurant steaks by 33%), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/anyone_s_guess -fmal web.pdf; see also William G.
Johnson et al., Dietary Restraint and Eating Behavior in the Natural Environment, 15
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 285, 285 (1990) (citing study by the University of Mississippi
finding that restaurant patrons consistently underestimate caloric content); Peter Urban,
DeLauro Wants Fast Food Calorie Count, CONN. POST, Nov. 6, 2003, at Al (citing
New York University study finding that nutritionists surveyed underestimated caloric
content of a hamburger and onion rings at Applebee's by 44%). For an extensive
explanation on the underestimation of calories in food, see Marion Nestle & Lisa R.
Young, Food Labels Consistently Underestimate the Actual Weights of Single-Serving
Baked Products, 95 J. AM. DIETErIc ASS'N 1150 (1995).
81. See Marion Nestle, Increasing Portion Sizes in American Diets: More
Calories, More Obesity, 103 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N 39, 39-40 (2003).
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fast food, they misinterpret the consequences and content of their
selections, and thus fail to achieve maximum utility for their purchasing
power. In other words, their supposedly rational decision to purchase
fast food incorporates false premises, thus rendering their choice
inherently uninformed. Accordingly, selection of fast food items may
better reflect illusory characteristics than undeterrable qualities, thus
begging the inquiry of whether reconstructed attitudes would yield
identical consumption choices.
Consider this concept as applied to a typical fast food setting. For
instance, assume a patron of Burger King decides to purchase and
consume a "Double Whopper with Cheese" sandwich. This item
contains 1070 calories. Assuming the consumer underestimates the
item's caloric content by 55%, however, she believes it contains only
589 calories. Would she have purchased the item had she known its true
caloric content? Or, does she exclusively value other prominent
attributes associated with fast food (for example, its low price, and its
quickly obtainable "great" taste), so that even had she been aware of its
true caloric content, she would have made the same selection regardless?
Applying consumer choice theory to a consumer's methodology in
purchasing food may help answer these questions, and also shed light on
the link between nutritional labeling and fast food items. Consumer
choice theory is a model of individual decision-making in a free market,
and it assumes that individuals are able to rank the outcomes that result
from their choices.' In ranking, individuals determine the relative
utility of one choice over another, balanced against abilities and
budgetary constraints, which attach a relative cost to each prospective
choice. More systematically, then, individuals utilize a three-step
process before making a decision, 3 and in the context of food choice,
this Article posits the three-step process as follows: (1) Food
Consumption Preferences-what food qualities (for example, taste or
nutrition) are most important to the consumer in her selection of food,
absent any external constraints (for example, price or availability)? (2)
Food Consumption Possibilities-what food items are actually available
to the consumer, given her income, the prices at which she must
purchase the items, and accessibility to those items? (3) The
Intersection Between Food Preferences and Food Possibilities-the point
at which a consumer's food preferences intersect with her possible food
82. See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1984
(2001) (applying emotions to the theory of consumer choice).
83. See generally JAMES R. BETrMAN, AN INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY
OF CONSUMER CHOICE 173-228 (1979) (analyzing the consumer's comparison process
and the factors which influence the consumer's decision-making process). Typically,
when products are difficult to differentiate according to other criteria, price becomes the
superseding factor in consumer purchasing decisions. See id. at 181.
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options explains why a consumer selects a particular food at a particular
time.
Doubtless, food choices vary by individual; some consumers place
a hypersensitive value on nutrition, and thus would never entertain the
notion of eating fast food. Yet, how about consumers less dogmatic in
their principles-those who value taste, nutrition, convenience, and price
all to a significant and nonmutually exclusive extent? It stands to reason
that these consumers' food choices would be affected by an erroneous
belief in a particular chosen item's nutritional content, since it would
affect how they prioritize their food consumption preferences.
As will now be explored, these phenomena are most intriguing in
the context of childhood consumption of fast food, since, in this setting,
parents often contemplate food choices for their young children, and
parents are generally intolerant of health risk to their children. Indeed,
parents place a higher premium on nutrition than taste in that decision-
making model than they do when they select their own food items or
those for other adults. Accordingly, it stands to reason that nutritional
information may prove uniquely elucidative under such circumstances.
E. Childhood Obesity and Food Selection
Of all age cohorts, children are increasingly prone to becoming
obese. This phenomenon is evident even among America's youngest, as
10% of children ages two to five are overweight, a statistic that has
risen over 40% since 19 9 4 .84 Similarly troubling, 15% of children ages
six to eleven are overweight or obese, compared with only 7% in 1980
and 4% in 1970.85 Older children tend to be even heavier, as over one
in five teenagers are obese.8 6 Other analyses suggest that children from
84. Sandra S. Smith, NCHS Dataline, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 483, 483 (2002);
see also Katherine Kaufer Christoffel & Adolfo Ariza, The Epidemiology of Overweight
in Children: Relevance for Clinical Care, 101 PEDIATRICS 103, 103 (1998) (noting that
from 1983 to 1995, the percentage of overweight one- to five-year-old children increased
from about 19% to nearly 22%).
85. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2003, at 234 (2003), available at
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus03.pdf.
86. See Vicki Berends, Prevalence of Fast Foods in California High Schools
Threatens Teen Health, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 16, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business, Wire
Service Stories; see also Shumei S. Guo et a]., The Predictive Value of Childhood Body
Mass Index Values for Overweight at Age 35 Years, 59 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 810,
810-19 (1994) (presenting study which finds that child obesity continues into adulthood).
Increasing obesity among children proves especially troubling for future trends, since
eating preferences formed in childhood tend to persist in adulthood. See Leann L. Birch
& Jennifer 0. Fisher, Development of Eating Behaviors Among Children and
Adolescents, 101 PEDIATRICS 539, 542 (Supp. 1998).
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economically disadvantaged environments are particularly vulnerable to
obesity, as fast food serves as an inexpensive meal option.87
Like their adult counterparts, obese children are progressively
responsible for substantial medical expenses, much of which are
absorbed by taxpayers. For instance, obesity-related hospital costs
among six- to seventeen-year-olds rose from $35 million in 1979 to
$127 million in 1999.88 Only exacerbating these costs, 80% of children
who become obese will remain so for the rest of their lives.89 Aside
from the physical costs of corpulence, obese children are frequently
ridiculed at school, thus causing untold emotional damage. 90
The growth in childhood obesity likely derives from myriad social
phenomena. For example, children are less likely to play outside than
in years past, with the average American child now spending more than
three hours per day watching television and another four hours using the
Internet or playing video games. 9' Moreover, children snack more often
87. See generally Mustillo et al., supra note 10, at 851 (finding that children
from minority and economically disadvantaged backgrounds are more susceptible to
obesity); see also U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, GUIDE TO CLINICAL
PREVENTIVE SERVICES 632 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that efforts to curb obesity must include
programs that tailored to specific groups, such as pregnant women or low-income
patients); Melinda S. Sothern & Stewart T. Gordon, Prevention of Obesity in Young
Children: A Critical Challenge for Medical Professionals, 42 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 101,
103 (2003) (presenting data that obesity among children is most prevalent in population
groups dominated by low-income residents). To illustrate this trend, consider that in
New York City, a recent study by the city's Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
found that a staggering 24% of students were obese and 19% were overweight. See
Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Nearly Half
of New York City's School Age Children are Overweight or Obese (July 8, 2003),
available at http:l/www.ci.nyc.ny.us/htmlldoh/html/publiclpressO3/prO75-0708.html.
88. H.R. Con. Res. 76, 108th Cong. (2003) (noting figures). Most children
rely on public health insurance coverage. See Sandra S. Smith, NCHS Dataline, 118
PUB. HEALTH REP. 565, 565 (2003).
89. Approximately 80% of obese ten- to thirteen-year-old children will become
obese adults. Sothern & Gordon, supra note 87, at 106. This dynamic was addressed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, where Justice Clarence
Thomas noted in his concurrence that "children's exposure to fast food advertising can
have deleterious consequences that are difficult to reverse." 533 U.S. 525, 588 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
90. See Christopher B. Forrest et al., Outcomes Research in Pediatric Settings:
Recent Trends and Future Directions, 111 PEDIATRICS 171, 176 (2003) (noting effect of
childhood obesity on children's emotional well-being). Dr. Richard H. Carmona, the
U.S. surgeon general has stated: "'Being overweight can cause a child deep and scarring
emotional pain when peers and even parents ridicule or criticize."' Alicia Ault,
Pediatricians Urged to Step Up Fight Against Obesity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at
F10.
91. See AM. MED. ASs'N, PHYSICIAN GUIDE TO MEDIA VIOLENCE 8 (1996)
(noting that children spend twenty-eight hours a week watching television); see also 150
CONG. REC. H1408 (2004) (statement of Rep. Osborne) ("The average child spends 6
hours a day watching television, playing with the computer or doing video games.").
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than in the past, with snacks now accounting for 18 % of the average
child's energy intake, or 50% more than in 1994.'
Also explaining the surge in childhood obesity is the parallel surge
in childhood consumption of fast food. According to a 2004 study
conducted jointly by the American Academy of Pediatrics and
Children's Hospital in Boston, such consumption among U.S. children
ages four to nineteen has increased approximately 500% since 1970.
93
Along these lines, children who consume fast food could theoretically
add, on average, six pounds to their weight per year, thus heightening
their risk of obesity. 94 Similarly alarming, young adults who eat fast
food more than twice a week are 86% more likely to become obese than
are those who eat fast food less frequently. 95 Perhaps most illuminating,
in any given month, 90% of American children between the ages of
three and nine eat at a McDonald's restaurant.9 6
Children's growing consumption of fast food has unquestionably
drawn the attention of the fast food industry. Indeed, as they are with
many industries, children are the foremost advertising targets of fast
food companies. In fact, food commercials account for more than 50%
of television advertising aimed at children, translating to as many as
three hours of food commercials each week.97 Put differently, the
average child in America observes at least 10,000 advertisements a year
for food, 95% of which pertain to fast food, soda, candy, and sugar-
fortified cereals. 98
One study confirms the correlation between children partaking in sedentary activities and
weight gain. Cara B. Ebbeling et al., Childhood Obesity: Public-Health Crisis,
Common Sense Cure, 360 LANCET 473, 475 (2002). For additional comprehensive
studies on children's time patterns, see Catherine S. Berkey et al., One-Year Changes in
Activity and in Inactivity Among 10- to 15-Year-Old Boys and Girls: Relationship to
Change in Body Mass Index, 111 PEDIATRICS 836 (2003); Steven L. Gomaker et al.,
Television Viewing as a Cause of Increasing Obesity Among Children in the United
States, 1986-1990, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 356 (1996).
92. See Ebbeling et al., supra note 91, at 476.
93. Bowman et al., supra note 46, at 112.
94. Id. at 114.
95. Id.
96. Ellen Goodman, Opinion Editorial, A Weighty Case Against Big Macs,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2002, at A19.
97. Strategic Alliance, Action Brief: Unhealthy Marketing to Kids, at
http://www.preventioninstitute.org/sa/pdf/SAAB-market.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2004). For an extensive study on the correlation between television viewing habits and
children's health, see Renee Boynton-Jarrett et al., Impact of Television Viewing
Patterns on Fruit and Vegetable Consumption Among Adolescents, 112 PEDIATRICS 1321
(2003).
98. Buck, supra note 15, at Al (citing a study by the Yale Center for Eating
and Weight Disorders).
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Several factors illuminate why children are uniquely receptive to
fast food advertisements. First, from a behavioral perspective, children
are more trusting than adults, and, as a result, commercial messages
tend to be viewed as advice from a friend. 9 Similarly, children under
the age of five are generally unable to discriminate between
programming and commercials, and children younger than eight are
normally unskilled to discern a commercial's persuasive intent. °°
Perhaps for these reasons, fast food companies often employ expressive
and warm mascots to pitch their food. McDonald's has likely been most
successful in this regard, as 96% of American schoolchildren can
identify Ronald McDonald, second only to Santa Claus in degree of
recognition.''
Second, children represent the most lucrative purchasing cohort of
any age group. 2 In fact, between their own spending and their
influence on parental spending, children four- to twelve-years-old are
responsible for approximately $600 billion a year in expenditures.13
Moreover, in recent years, children's buying power has increased faster
than any other age group. "4  Not surprisingly, therefore, fast food
99. Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com: Should Government Regulate
Advertising to Children on the World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 311, 320 (1997-
1998) (citing Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 11, 16
(1974)). The effect of television on children's subsequent behavioral patterns has been
highlighted as a prime explanation for insufficient attention spans. See generally Dimitri
A. Christakis et al., Early Television Exposure and Subsequent Attentional Problems in
Children, 113 PEDIATRICS 708, 710 (2004) (reporting study testing correlation of early
television exposure and poor attention spans).
100. Campbell, supra note 99, at 321.
101. See Strategic Alliance, supra note 97. One nutritional advocate even
laments, "thousands of young children now think of burgers and chips every time they
see a clown with orange hair [that is, Ronald McDonald]." Marlene Arnold Nicholson,
McLibel: A Case Study in British Defamation Law, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 139 (2000).
102. JAMES U. MCNEAL, KIDS AS CUSTOMERS: A HANDBOOK OF MARKETING TO
CHILDREN 1-20 (1992); see also David Barboza, If You Pitch It, They Will Eat It, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 3, at I (confirming continuing accuracy of McNeal's study).
For an extensive study on consumerism and children, see Mona L. Hymel,
Consumerism. Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 347, 405-07
(2000).
103. See Barboza, supra note 102, § 3, at 1; see also Chris Reidy, Chasing
"Tweens": Reebok Joins the Race for the $10 Billion Spent by Americans Aged 7
Through 12, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, at C1 (stating that, of the twenty million
Americans who fall between the ages of seven and twelve, their collective allowance is
$10 billion).
104. See Karen E. Rondon, Innovations and Trends in the Electronic Toy
Market, at 10 (SRI Consulting, Bus. Intelligence Program, No. D96-2028, 1996),
available at http://www.sric-bi.com/. "Spending by children is growing faster than that
of any other demographic group. Children spend nearly $2.5 billion of their own money
annually on toys and directly influence more than $17 billion in annual toy
consumption." Id.
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companies allocate most of their advertising and promotional budgets to
the targeting of children.' 05
Third, and more specific to fast food advertising, children are
especially valuable as future customers."°  In point of fact, the
University of Liverpool recently concluded that obese children are more
receptive to fast food advertising on television than are normal-weight
youngsters.1°7 To attract and keep these children in their purchasing
audience, fast food companies attempt to establish brand loyalty at an
early age. In doing so, these companies routinely link children's toys to
fast food meals.0 8  A particularly impressive example of this
phenomenon was Burger King's Teletubbies toy promotion in 2000,
which is credited with doubling the company's sales to children that
year. 109
A recent report published in the Journal of the American Dietetic
Association confirms the considerable effect of fast food advertising on
children's eating patterns."0 Specifically, when observing the eating
patterns of children ages two through six, short-term preferences for
105. Nicholson, supra note 101, at 139 (noting that McDonald's directs most of
its $1.5 billion advertising and promotional budget toward children); see also Stuart
Elliot, McDonald's Campaign Aims to Regain the Youth Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
2003, at C4.
106. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY
INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 25 (2002) (stating that candy, gum, and snacks
constituted the largest category of new food products introduced in 1998 as a means to
attract sales from children); Jane E. Brody, Schools Teach 3 C's: Candy, Cookies and
Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at F7 (quoting Nestle as writing, "[gliven their
purchasing power, numbers, potential as future customers and captive status, it is no
wonder that food companies view schoolchildren as an unparalleled marketing
opportunity").
107. Press Release, University of Liverpool, Obese Children More Receptive to
Food Adverts, Say Psychologists (Oct. 16, 2003), available at
http://liv.ac.uklpro/news/press releases/20030obesitystudy.htm.
108. See Strategic Alliance, supra note 97. One expert has even stated that the
"popular culture of our children has become indistinguishable from the fast-food
culture." See Schlosser, supra note 47, at 48. McDonald's is the world's largest toy
distributor. Sandra Eckstein, Playing with Food, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 6, 2004, at
NW6.
109. See Kath Dalmeny, Food Marketing: The Role of Advertising in Child
Health, 13 CONSUMER POL'Y REv. 2, 3 (2003). Similarly, and more recently,
McDonald's signed pop star Justin Timberlake to a $6 million endorsement contract,
with the explicit expectation that Timberlake's popularity with children will boost sales.
See Elliot, supra note 105, at C4.
110. See Dina L.G. Borzekowski & Thomas N. Robinson, The 30-Second
Effect: An Experiment Revealing the Impact of Television Commercials on Food
Preferences of Preschoolers, 101 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N. 42, 42 (2001). In addition,
"television viewing during mealtime is inversely associated with consumption of
products not typically advertised, such as fruits and vegetables." See Ebbeling et al.,
supra note 9 1, at 475.
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specific food products were significantly influenced by only one or two
exposures to ten- to thirty-second food commercials."' Perhaps more
importantly, members of the U.S. Supreme Court have recently
identified such advertising as especially effectual. In Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, Justice Clarence Thomas, in a concurring opinion,
acknowledged that "there is considerable evidence that [fast food
commercials] have been successful in changing children's eating
behavior."' 2
Aside from traditional advertising venues, fast food companies
routinely engage in direct, targeted contact with children. This
materialization is most evidenced by the increasing prevalence of fast
food restaurants on public school campuses. According to the CDC,
approximately 20% of public schools in the United States now lease
space to popular fast food companies."' School administrators often
invite these companies to lease space because it provides budgetary
supplements for other programs, such as team sports, marching band
uniforms, and musical instruments. 114  Although federal dietary
standards control school lunch programs, fast food items are typically
sold separately, thus falling outside the scope of nutritional
regulations." 5
Fast food restaurants also access school campuses through
"Channel One," a private venture that supplies schools with
complimentary video equipment so that it can ostensibly broadcast news
to students. Although students receive daily ten-minute news updates
through Channel One, they are also required to view two minutes of
commercials, and these commercials include fast food advertisements." 6
Approximately 8.3 million students in 12,000 public schools now watch
Channel One." 7 Aside from Channel One, public school districts have
111. Borzekowski & Robinson, supra note 110, at 45.
112. 533 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring).
113. Dan Freedman, Low Fat? The Kids Aren't Buying, TIMES UNION, Sept.
22, 2002, at Al. In California, for instance, it is estimated that most school districts sell
fast food, with Taco Bell, Subway, and Dominos Pizza ranking as the top brands sold.
Berends, supra note 86. Joseph Hafey, president and chief executive officer of the
Public Health Institute, a California-based nonprofit health organization, has remarked,
"[flast foods on California campuses have become an epidemic." Id.
114. See Freedman, supra note 113, at Al.
115. Federal dietary standards for public school lunches are regulated by two
legislative acts: School Lunch Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769 (providing funds for
public schools to provide "nutritious" school lunches); and Child Nutrition, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 177 1-1791 (2000) (setting standards for necessary nutrition of public school lunches).
116. Christina Lee Dasinger, Students for Sale: The Regulation of Televised
Commercial Advertising in Public Schools, 20 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 197, 197 (1996); see
also Elizabeth Becker & Marian Burros, Eat Your Vegetables? Only at a Few Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at Al (noting increased popularity of Channel One).
117. Brody, supra note 106, at F7. These figures represent at least 40% of all
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begun resorting to billboard advertising on school buses and signs in
school hallways as ways to generate revenue."18 The Colorado Springs
School District 11, for instance, generates approximately $150,000 a
year through these types of sponsorships. "9
The presence of the fast food industry on school campuses likely
poses significant conflicts of interest for children's health. For one, in
schools which lease space to fast food companies, the traditional, and
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) approved, cafeteria lunch
options are coopted by generally better-tasting and less-healthy food
choices. In fact, it is estimated that more than half of students in those
schools opt for fast food lunches rather than either cafeteria selections or
lunches brought from home.' 20 Likewise concerning, the mere presence
of fast food alternatives in school cafeterias may diminish the credibility
of health education courses, as health instructors are expected to teach
nutritional values in a setting that facilitates consumption of innutritious
items.12' Only making the job of health instructor more challenging is
that physical education has declined rapidly in recent years, with the
proportion of public schools offering such courses falling from 42% in
1991 to only 29% in 1999 .'22
Predictably, children appear increasingly likely to consume fast
food upon encountering such substantial external influence on their food
choices. Indeed, more so than other age groups, children are prone to
take risks, weigh short-term consequences more heavily than long-term
public schools. Hymel, supra note 102, at 408.
118. See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Communications,
Children, Adolescents, and Advertising, 95 PEDIATRICS 295 (1995) (presenting study by
American Academy of Pediatrics on the influence of advertising in schools).
119. Jonathan Saltzman, Taking Ads to School: Fiscal Crunch Has 2 Districts
Selling Hot Display Space, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2003, at B9.
120. See Becker & Burros, supra note 116, at A14. Other studies confirm that
fast food advertisements aired on Channel One "urge immediate self-indulgence"
because observing students can then readily purchase those items at school. See, e.g.,
Campbell, supra note 99, at 324 (citing Mark Crispin Miller, How to Be Stupid: The
Lessons of Channel One, EXTRA!, May/June 1997, at 23); Nestle & Jacobson, supra
note 7, at 18-21.
121. See Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 19.
122. See Nat'l Cir. for Health Statistics, NCHS Dataline, 116 PuB. HEALTH
REP. 273, 274 (2001). Also consider that most state governments have declined
programs that would enhance children's awareness of the long-term consequences of
obesity and overconsumption. See generally Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 19.
On the other hand, note that California funds "Leaders Encouraging Activity and
Nutrition" ("LEAN"), a program that trains high school students in nutrition, physical
education, and advocacy. LEAN has been credited with preparing teen leaders to
champion nutrition efforts amongst their peers. See Peggy Agron et al., California
Project LEAN's Food on the Run Program: An Evaluation of a High School-Based
Student Advocacy Nutrition and Physical Activity Program, 102 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N
103, 103 (2002).
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consequences, and uncritically ascribe to advice or suggestion. "'
However, this trend of increasing consumption cannot be viewed in a
vacuum, nor can the fast food industry be "blamed" without addressing
every relevant actor. That is, when a child frequents fast food
restaurants, is she often joined by a parent or guardian? If so, does she
order her own meal, or does her parent or guardian place the order?
These questions are meaningful, since studies routinely find that
parents possess substantial control over the types and amounts of food
consumed by their children, particularly when those children are under
the age of twelve. 1" Of perhaps greater societal interest, the food
preferences of adults are predominantly shaped by their eating habits as
children.' In other words, parents play perhaps the pivotal role in
determining their children's weight for the rest of their lives. This is an
especially material deduction when considering that parents tend to
markedly underestimate the daily caloric intake of their children, most
often in the absence of nutritional labeling.'
26
Since parents tend to influence or select a child's food choice, and
since they tend to care significantly more about their children's nutrition
than that of their own or that of other adults,' 27 consumer choice theory
123. See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child's Voice in Custody Litigation: An
Empirical Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 629, 657 (2003).
124. See, e.g., Bowman et al., supra note 46, at 115-16 (finding that preteen
fast food customers are influenced by parents in making selections or are told by parents
as to which items to select); Susan L. Johnson, Improving Preschoolers' Self-Regulation
of Energy Intake, 106 PEDIATRICS 1429, 1430 (2000) (concluding that parents tend to
view decisions about children's eating as under their purview); Robert C. Klesges et al.,
Parental Influence on Food Selection in Young Children and Its Relationships to
Childhood Obesity, 53 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 859, 861 (1991) (providing general
study on the influence of parents on children's food selection); VA. DEP'T OF PUB.
HEALTH, REPORT ON THE CHILD NUTRITION Focus GROUP PROJECT 1-3 (1998) (finding
that parents often choose the meals for children when at home), available at
http://www.vahealth.org/nutrition/sac/execsumm_698.pdf.
125. See Birch & Fisher, supra note 86, at 542-43; see also Robert L. Brent &
Michael Weitzman, The Pediatrician's Role and Responsibility in Educating Parents
About Environmental Risks, 113 PEDIATRICS 1167, 1169 (2004) (noting that humans tend
to develop lifelong eating habits between the ages of one and four).
126. See Michael I. Goran, Measurement Issues Related to Studies of Childhood
Obesity: Assessment of Body Composition, Body Fat Distribution, Physical Activity, and
Food Intake, 101 PEDIATRICS 505, 512 (1998) ("[T]he inability of the parent to correctly
appraise serving sizes, the degree of the perceived value of the food items [served], and
the fact that children tend to better remember preferred foods as larger portions than
nonpreferred foods augments [the difficulty to remember the caloric intake of the
children].").
127. See Jordan D. Metzl et al., Creatine Use Among Young Athletes, 108
PEDIATRICS 421, 423 (2001) (concluding that parents are often receptive to information
about optimum nutrition); see also Mary Frances Picciano et al., Nutritional Guidance Is
Needed During Dietary Transition in Early Childhood, 106 PEDIATRICS 109, 112-13
(2000) (noting that parents often determine eating choices of children).
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can query the assumptions and priorities of those parents upon selecting
meals for their children. Indeed, by deduction, a typical parent selecting
a child's meal would likely be affected by mistaken assumptions about a
food's nutritional content, because in that consumption decision, the
parent prioritizes nutrition ahead of both taste and price, and she
internalizes a diminished toleration of risk. 28  Accordingly, enhancing
the transmission of nutritional information in this limited instance
appears worthy of further exploration. Moreover, since the food
preferences of adults are predominantly shaped by their eating habits as
children, this mode of analysis may impact macroeconomic fundaments,
namely taxpayer absorption for the treatment of obesity and obesity-
related illness, and the manner in which public resources are
allocated. 129
Also consider that insufficient or even misleading transmission of
nutritional information, especially in the context of fast food
consumption, has recently attracted the interest of the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Lorillard Tobacco, Justice Thomas acknowledged in his
concurrence the prevalence of fast food consumption, and its link to
obesity and poor health: "[allthough the growth of obesity over the last
few decades has had many causes, a significant factor has been the
increased availability of large quantities of high-calorie, high-fat
foods." 3 ' In doing so, Justice Thomas chose to contrast the similar
marketing strategies employed by both the tobacco and fast food
industries, particularly since tobacco use and fast food consumption are
the two leading causes of preventable death in the United States. 3 ' As a
result, one may deduce that the link between fast food consumption,
inadequate information, and ill health has never been clearer. As shown
in the next Part, however, federal lawmakers have avoided making this
very link.
128. See, e.g., Not All Fresh Foods are Created Equal, According to
Consumers, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 22, 1993 (reporting a study which found that nutrition
is the most salient characteristic for choosing fruit); Francis Wardle & Nola Winegamer,
Nutrition and Head Start, CHILDREN TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1992 (noting that parents
recognize the importance of nutrition in responding to food requests by their children),
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m 1053/is- nlv21/ai_13255502.
129. Supra Part I.B (discussing taxpayer absorption of obesity).
130. 533 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 587-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Respondents say that tobacco




II. LAWMAKING AND FAST FOOD LABELING: WHERE'S THE BEEF?
A. Federal Labeling Requirements Imposed on Commercial Food
As a way of warning Americans that heavy food consumption may
lead to obesity, Congress passed the NLEA 32 to clarify and strengthen
the FDA legal authority to require nutritional labeling on food.
3
Principally, the NLEA requires that food manufacturers provide
nutritional labels for most items sold in retail food stores."s  Along
these lines, the NLEA was designed to embolden the FDA's legal
authority to require nutritional labeling.1 35  In terms of statutory
development, the NLEA added two subsections-(q) and (r)-to section
403 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), thereby
creating two new food-labeling provisions. 36  Section 403(q) specifies
the general nutritional labeling standards and requirements, while
section 403(r) limits the ability of food manufacturers to make
unsubstantiated health claims. 137 Moreover, since the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services bears the ultimate
responsibility for administering FDCA, and since the NLEA merely
adds to the FDCA, the Secretary also possesses the ultimate
responsibility for administering the NLEA."'3
Following passage of the NLEA in 1990, the FDA issued labeling
regulations specifically describing when a food label could employ the
words "light," "low-calorie," and "low-fat" to describe a product. 3 9
These regulations also require that food manufacturers place the familiar
"Nutrition Facts" graphic on the labels of all processed foods.' 4 This
graphic, which utilizes a uniform format, displays the amount per
132. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended at
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397).
133. H.R. REP. No. 101-538, at 7 (1990); see also Marilyn J. Schramm,
Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech Under the Central Hudson Test As
Applied to Health Claims, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 323, 328 (1996). The NLEA sought
"'to ensure that consumers have access to information about food that is scientifically
valid, truthful, reliable, understandable and not misleading. This information will enable
consumers to make more healthful food choices.'" Schramm, supra, at 328.
134. § 2, 104 Stat. at 2353.
135. See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reaffirming
FDA's legal authority with respect to nutritional labeling).
136. § 2, 104 Stat. at 2353-57 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343).
137. Id. at 2353-59.
138. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a). The authority of the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services in this setting has been delegated to the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs. 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1).
139. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.13. For an official explanation of the food labeling,
see Marilynn Larkin, Losing Weight Safely, 30 FDA CONSUMER 16, 19-20 (1996).
140. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(a)(1) (2004).
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serving of calories, saturated fat, dietary fiber, and other nutrients., 4 It
also provides "nutrient reference values," as expressed as "% Daily
Values," which purportedly "help[s] consumers see how a food fits into
an overall diet." 42
To the dismay of many health advocates, however, restaurants are
largely exempt from the NLEA. Generating the most controversy,
restaurants are fully absolved of section 403(q), which created the new
general nutritional labeling standards and requirements." However,
section 403(r), which restricts the ability of purveyors of food to present
claims about a particular food's healthy nature, imposes that very
limited restriction on restaurants.'" Therefore, unless fast food
companies affirmatively champion their food's healthy nature, the
NLEA compels upon them no legal obligation to reveal their dishes'
relatively high fat and caloric content.
By 1993, criticism of the NLEA's inability to affect the fast food
industry reached new levels, as a number of fast food companies added
"low fat" or "healthy" dishes to their menus without substantiating why
those items were so healthy. 145 As a result, the FDA promulgated new
regulations to require that those purportedly "healthy" menu items meet
some, though not all, of the nutrition labeling requirements imposed on
food sold in grocery stores. 46 Specifically, restaurants were ordered to
change their menus' presentation of "healthy" items so that they were
either "designed to meet the requirements for the claim because it was
prepared using a recipe from a recognized health professional
association or dietary group" or "the nutritional values for the dish were
calculated using a reliable nutrition data base."' 47 Restaurants were
allotted ten months to make the requisite changes. 48
141. Id. § 101.9(d)(12)-(13).
142. Id.; FDA, THE FOOD LABEL (1999) [hereinafter FDA FOOD LABEL],
available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/foodlabel/newlabel.html.
143. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i). As soon as the NLEA became law in 1990,
criticism arose concerning the ability of fast food companies to evade its reach. For
example, former New York Attorney General Robert Abrams referred to the NLEA
insulation of fast food restaurants as "'inappropriate,'" reasoning "too many people
regularly eat fast food to allow these phony health claims to proliferate unchecked."
Karen Riley, New York Won't Take Foods' Low-Fat Claims Lite-ly, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
31, 1991, at C3. As will be discussed in Part IlI, New York became the first state to
actively prod the fast food industry into divulging nutritional information.
144. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(B).
145. See generally Louise Hildago, Health Claims on Food Baffle the Shopper,
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at 5 (detailing consumer uncertainty regarding nutritional claims
of various food products).
146. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.65; see also Press Release, Food and Drug
Administration, Menu Labeling (June 10, 1993) (providing the official explanation for
the regulations), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/newsnewOO41O.html.
147. FDA, TALK PAPER: NUTRITION INFORMATION ON RESTAURANT MENUS (July
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Despite its increased scrutiny of the restaurant industry, the FDA
freely acknowledged that, "unlike processed foods, menu items bearing
a claim are not held to the same strict standards of laboratory
analyses."' 49 In fact, initially under the NLEA, health claims for
nonrestaurant foods and dietary supplements required FDA premarket
approval, which was based on "the totality of publicly available
scientific evidence ... [that the claim is supported by] significant
scientific agreement, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience."' 5  Although the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA")"' removed the requirement of
FDA approval, it still mandated that claims for nonrestaurant food be
derived from "authoritative statements" of a scientific body. 52 In stark
contrast, restaurants could rely instead on a recipe from any
"recognizable health professional association" to establish their healthy
menu items.15 3
To further illustrate the comparatively lax treatment of restaurants,
the FDA, in establishing a sufficiency standard for a restaurant's "low
fat" claims, utilized a mirror standard to that required by the NLEA for
restaurant signs or placards containing nutritional or health claims: only
those menu items containing nutritional content or health claims were
subject to the NLEA, and only a "reasonable" explanation was
mandated to explain how those claims fell within the statutory
definitions. To exemplify "reasonableness," if a restaurant desired to
place hearts on its menu as a way of indicating that certain dishes were
low in fat, the restaurant would have to explain the meaning of the
hearts, and offer specific information to support those claims."
Specific information could, for instance, refer to a low-fat recipe in an
American Medical Association cookbook; alternatively, a simple




150. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i).
151. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2350, 2351 (1997) (amending 21 U.S.C. §
343(r)(3)).
152. However, those claims still must be authorized by the FDA, and must
demonstrate that they are based on an "authoritative statement" of a scientific body. Id.
at 2350-51. For a discussion on the parameters of an "authoritative statement," see
Ilene Ringel Heller, Functional Foods: Regulatory and Marketing Developments, 56
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 197, 200-01 (2001).
153. FDA TALK PAPER, supra note 147.
154. See Marian Burros, U.S. Wants to Keep Menus Honest on Nutrition
Claims, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Burros, Nutrition Claims].
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notation that the item derived from lean meat or a similar ingredient
could suffice.' 55
The 1993 regulations also supplied restaurants with considerable
flexibility in formulating delivery of their foods' nutritional
information." 6 Replicating its requirement of claim explanation, the
FDA required only "reasonableness" on the part of restaurants when
informing consumers of their dishes' content.'57  Notably,
reasonableness did not oblige restaurants to employ the widely
identifiable "Nutrition Facts" format required on packaged food
labels. 158 Instead, restaurants were accorded wide latitude in satisfying
sufficient "reasonableness," including the FDA's stated allowance that
"restaurants should be able to make their own determinations" as to the
explanation of an item's nutrition. 1'9
Despite the considerably limited scope of the 1993 regulations, the
National Restaurant Association maintained that restaurants would be
saddled with excessive menu revision costs.1'6 Importantly, however, if
restaurants did not avail the healthiness or low-fat nature of their food,
they could continue to shield those foods from nutritional disclosure.
This arrangement continues to this day. 161 Simply put, if a restaurant
menu item fails to advocate promotion of good health, the restaurant
bears no obligation to divulge that item's nutritional content-even upon
customer request. 62 Since most restaurant items are not promoted as
155. See id.
156. See FDA TALK PAPER, supra note 147.
157. Id.
158. Id. To respond to ambiguity regarding the "reasonable" standard of
delivery, the FDA published 2 FOOD LABELING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: A GUIDE FOR
RESTAURANTS AND OTHER RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS (1995) [hereinafter FDA
RESTAURANT GUIDE], available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/guidance.html#lab.
This book was made available at no cost through the FDA.
159. See FDA RESTAURANT GUIDE, supra note 158.
160. See Burros, Nutrition Claims, supra note 154, at Al.
161. Note that in 1995, a number of public health advocates sued the FDA in
order to confirm that the NLEA applied to restaurant menus, rather than merely placards
and posters. In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Shalala, 932 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1996), the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed that the NLEA could regulate
restaurant menus, provided that those menus championed the health advantages of their
food. Id. at 17. Most significantly, the court found that "[the NLEA] governs all
nutrition and health claims made in the labeling of food and expressly details the extent
of restaurant coverage." Id. at 16 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1), (r)(5)(B)).
162. This rather significant loophole has drawn the attention of the FDA. See
Letter from Kristy Moran, Food and Drug Administration Executive Secretariat, to
Deborah J. Alexander 1-2 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Letter from Kristy Moran]
(noting that the FDA encourages ingredient labeling of restaurant foods), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailyslO1/SepO1/0907O1/ansOOO6.pdf. It has also
been highlighted by the media. See, e.g., Sally Squires, Eating Right, WASH. POST,
Jan. 1, 2002, at F5 (noting that only some fast food restaurants offer nutritional
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such, this narrow exception has scarcely impacted the restaurant
industry.
The FDA recently reaffirmed its position to exempt restaurants
from labeling obligations. In a letter dated August 31, 2001, the FDA
Executive Secretariat Kristy Moran stated:
[W]e believe that it may be feasible for certain types of
restaurants (e.g. chain or fast food restaurants with
standardized food preparation and ingredient specifications) to
provide ingredient information. However, at this time, the
agency does not have enough information about the industry to
determine the appropriateness and manner of requiring
ingredient labeling by restaurants.163
Although this statement applies to ingredient, rather than nutritional,
information, it nevertheless illuminates the regulatory constraints
imposed upon the FDA in promulgating labeling regulations. Indeed,
the FDA presently champions "declarations on a voluntary basis.""6
B. Examining the Labeling Exemption for Restaurants
The merits of the labeling exemption for restaurants proves worthy
of exploration, particularly since the strength of such merits may
fluctuate by restaurant type. This Section will discuss the five most
heralded rationales for the exemption, and evaluate them in the larger
context of nutritional notification and consumer choice.
First, the restaurant industry often scorns the costs of legislatively
compelled menu modification, claiming that expenses inherent in
promulgating new menus increase the cost of doing business. 165 In the
context of the NLEA, however, such expenses have likely proven
minimal, since the NLEA only requires nutritional information for those
restaurant items claiming to promote good health.166 Moreover, even if
restaurants were compelled to fully comply with the NLEA, sunk costs
information upon request).
163. Letter from Kristy Moran, supra note 162, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 2. On the other hand, the FDA has no statutory authority under the
NLEA to mandate nutritional disclosure by the fast food industry, so its reluctance may
be explained simply by its lack of authority. See supra Part II.A.
165. See Cimons, supra note 44, at A23 (citing comments by Michael E. Hurst,
president of the National Restaurant Association); see also Press Release, Coalition for
California Jobs, Job Killer Bills 2003 4 (May 29, 2003) (arguing that menu modification
would prove costly and thus make it more difficult to employ workers), available at
http://www.cajobsfirst.org/pdf/jobkillerlist_052803.pdf.
166. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i).
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would already encompass most, if not all, expenses inherent in
compliance, as menus are routinely modified for business reasons, such
as price increases, meal alterations, and item additions.167
A second and related refrain pertains to space: menus, including
drive-through displays, are limited in size, and nutritional information
may therefore prove difficult to display. 68 One possible remedy to this
concern would be for restaurants to post nutritional information on every
table or, in the case of fast food restaurants, on the cartons of fast food
items, similar to the nutritional information posted on the cartons of
packaged foods sold in grocery stores. Yet, in that arrangement,
nutritional information would be furnished after the point of sale, unlike
nutritional information found on packaged groceries. Considering that
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) finds that 70% of food
shoppers in grocery stores make their purchase decisions at "the point at
which [they] are being directly exposed to label information," the value
of providing nutritional information after the point of sale appears
insufficient. '69
Alternatively, some fast food restaurants now post nutritional
information on their websites, such as http://www.mcdonalds.com or
http://www.burgerking.com. Two factors, however, diminish the
content. First, as many as 42 % of Americans remain without Internet
access, and those with modest amounts of income and education, those
most in need of nutritional information, 170 are significantly "less wired"
than those in higher income brackets or those with college degrees. 17 1
Second, such online nutritional information often proves obtuse or
incomplete. For instance, on Burger King's website, aggregate caloric
content and fat content are listed for each menu item, yet, unlike the
nutrition facts format dictated by the NLEA, the reader does not learn of
167. See21 C.F.R. § 101.10.
168. Steven C. Anderson, president of the National Restaurant Association,
insists, "I just don't see the practicality of it. I don't know how you'd do that."
Margaret Webb Pressler, A Super-Size Backlash: Restaurant Menus Feature More with
Less, WASH. PosT, Aug. 6, 2003, at El.
169. See FDA, IN THE MATTER OF OBESrry WORI NG GROUP 7 n.14 (Dec. 12,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/vO4OOO3text.pdf; see also Pressler, supra
note 168, at E4 (noting that at the point of sale a consumer observes information at the
most accessible and most important point). On the other hand, the value of on-table or
on-carton labeling may be greater for repeat customers than for new customers, since
they would repeatedly encounter those labels.
170. Studies have identified a correlation between wealth and obesity. See, e.g.,
OFFICE OF TTrE SURGEON GEN., supra note 22, at 13-14; Bobinski, supra note 30, at
379.
171. Press Release, Pew Internet & American Life Project, The Shifting Internet




the daily nutritional percentage that such content comprises. As a result,
while a reader may observe that a "Double Whopper with Cheese"
sandwich contains sixty-nine grams of saturated fat, she does not
observe that consuming sixty-nine grams of saturated fat would provide
approximately 110% of her suggested daily intake of saturated fat.172
A third rationale pertains to restaurants' tendency to purchase fresh
food, which sometimes varies by season, meaning that menu items can
often fluctuate in size and caloric content depending upon the availability
of quality ingredients."' As a result, restaurant menus would potentially
require frequent and cumbersome changes to satisfy the NLEA. This
concern, however, seems inapplicable to fast food items, since those
items are standardized, just like processed foods found in grocery stores.
If anything, fast food is remarkable for enabling customers to receive
the same product no matter which store they visit, or what season they
visit it in. 174
A fourth, and perhaps more plausible concern for fast food
companies, is that their ingredients are protected creations, and, if
divulged, could be copied. For instance, during the early 1980s, when a
McDonald's customer requested ingredient information, the customer
would usually receive a letter stating, "'I hope you understand, in a
business such as ours, why we cannot release complete ingredient
lists.""7 " Revealing nutritional information, however, seems far less
"protective" than revealing ingredients. To illustrate this point,
consider that Coca-Cola Inc., in adherence to the NLEA, openly
divulges the nutritional information for its Coca-Cola soft drink, despite
172. See Burger King Corp., supra note 65.
173. For example, if a restaurant chef does not have fresh tomatoes at her
disposal, she would probably not use tomatoes in making a sandwich, thus affecting the
sandwich's caloric and nutritional content. See Cimons, supra note 44, at A23. Also
consider comments by Dick Grotton, executive vice president of the Maine Restaurant
Association:
They're asking us to provide something that is impossible
[because]... portion sizes can change. You will end up with widely
varying information as far as calorie content, sugar, and sodium is
concerned. And what happens if the truck arrives at five [o'clock] and all
they have is another type of ice cream? Suddenly, the calorie count is not
the same as posted. We have an accuracy issue here.
Paul Frumkin, States Launch Efforts to Require Chains' Posting of Nutrition Facts,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEws, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1, 77.
174. In Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (2003) ("Pelnan
I"), Judge Robert W. Sweet observed this very point: "[a McDonald's] Big Mac is the
same at every outlet in the Bronx, New York; the same at every outlet in the State of
New York; and the same at every outlet throughout the United States." Id. at 523.
175. Marian Burros, De Gustibus: Soon You'll Know What's in a Burger, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1986, at 32 [hereinafter Burros, De Gustibus].
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the fact that it has long guarded the "secret" ingredient formula
triggering the product's popular taste.' 76
Lastly, fast food companies contend that the "Nutrition Facts"
graphic itself has proven woefully ineffective in communicating dietary
choices for consumers; and that it would prove similarly ineffective
when used in the restaurant context. Perhaps the most controversial
component of the graphic is the "standardized serving size" which
purportedly facilitates making nutritional comparison of similar
products. The NLEA defines serving size "as the amount of food
customarily eaten at one time,' ' 177 and its implementing regulations
supply manufacturers with serving sizes for particular products or food
categories.7 7 As a source of some confusion, however, similar food
products are occasionally allotted disparate serving sizes, thus making
nutritional comparison between products challenging. For instance,
while one serving size of such items as donuts and pastries is measured
at fifty-five grams, one serving size of popcorn and pretzels is measured
at thirty grams. Even identical products in different sizes can present
perception problems. For example, a twelve-ounce can of Coca-Cola
contains 140 calories and is considered a single serving, yet a twenty-
ounce bottle of Coca-Cola contains 330 calories and lists 100 calories as
a single serving.' 8° As a result, certain consumers may not readily
observe differences in serving size between similar or identical products,
and they may thus consume more calories than desired. '8'
Despite the limitations of the nutrition facts format, consumer
choice appears enhanced by observation of nutritional content; criticism
of the format often fails to consider that an imperfect format generally
proves superior to no format at all.8 2 This is particularly meaningful
since consumers routinely underestimate calorie counts of the food they
176. See generally FREDERICK ALLEN, SECRET FORMULA (1994) (discussing the
success and secrecy of the Coca-Cola formula).
177. FDA FOOD LABEL, supra note 142.
178. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 101.12.
179. Id. § 101.12(b).
180. Sherri Day, The Smoke and Mirrors of Food Labeling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2003, at Cl.
181. See T.R. Smith & A.M. Smith, Effectiveness of an Instructional Videotape
on Ability to Estimate Food Portion Sizes, 101 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N 982, A-98 (Supp.
1 2001). For this reason, in December 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
recommended to the FDA that serving sizes be revisited because they "may significantly
understate the amount of particular foods and calories that people typically consume."
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Weighs in on Food Labels and
Obesity (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/12/fdaobesity.htm.
182. For example, consider how scientific researchers regard an imperfect
format for accumulating epidemiological data as preferable to no format. See Gyles R.
Glover et al., Is the Money Following the Clients with Learning Disabilities?, 306 BRrr.
MED. J. 987, 987 (1993).
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order. 8 3 Moreover, according to one study, most consumers regard the
nutrition facts format as highly effective: 90%, in fact, believe the
format "makes it easier to tell if a food is high or low in fat," while
70% regard it as "more clear and understandable" than previous (and
manufacturer-varied) incarnations of nutrition facts.14 Equally
important, to the extent the format is indeed flawed, the FDA is
currently considering methods to enhance it.' 85
C Inefficiencies in Promulgating Labeling Laws and Regulations
Although its opposition to divulging nutritional information may not
clearly validate its exemption from labeling requirements, the restaurant
industry has nonetheless effectively lobbied Congress. Along these
lines, advocates of campaign finance reform contend that such preferred
treatment can be attributed to substantial campaign contributions.
According to the Center for Public Integrity, the fast food industry has
proven especially generous in this regard, having contributed more than
$41 million to congressional and senatorial races from 1988 to 1998.116
McDonald's, the largest fast food corporation, alone supplied $1.7
million to congressional races during this time.8 7
183. See supra Part I.D.
184. See Sheldon Margen & Dale A. Ogar, Assessing New Labels, RECORD
Sept. 28, 1994, at C1 (citing a 1994 study conducted by Prevention Magazine, which
also found that 67% of people "believed the format has helped to improve their diets"
and 54% felt that reading the format changed a decision to buy or use a food at least
once a month); see also ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, FDA, THE IMPACT OF THE
NLEA ON CONSUMERS: RECENT FINDINGS FROM FDA's FOOD LABEL AND NUTRITION
TRACKING SYSTEM (1996) (reporting that 48% of people find that nutrition information
on food labels causes them to change their minds about buying a food product),
available at http: //vm.cfsan. fda. gov/- dms/hclm-rpt.html.
185. See FTC: Serving-Size Labels May Mislead, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 22,
2003, at F3. The FDA has opened such discussions to the public as well. Nutrition
Subcommittee of the Food Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting, 69 Fed. Reg.
16,275 (Mar. 29, 2004).
186. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, SAFETY LAST: THE POLITICS OF E. COLI AND
OTHER FOOD-BORNE KILLERS 2 (1998), available at
http:/!www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/safetylast.pdf.
187. Id. at 78. However, contributions by the restaurant industry should be
placed in context. For instance, in the 2002 federal election cycle, trial attorneys out
contributed McDonald's by a ratio of forty-five to one. Personal Responsibility in
Consumption Act: Hearing on H.R. 339 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 6-7 (2003) (statement of Rep. Ric Keller, Member, House Comm. on the
Judiciary). Moreover, fast food and other restaurants most often contributed to the
campaigns of Congress's top leaders, including Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott, Richard
Gephardt, and Tom Daschle. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 186, at 2. Dan
Glickman, former Secretary of Agriculture under President Clinton, likewise received
substantial contributions while he served as a congressman from Kansas. Id.
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Recent political activity appears perhaps even more illustrative of
the link between preferential treatment and campaign contributions.
Consider that during the 2000, 2002, and 2004 election cycles, food and
beverage companies have, to date, contributed $170,000 to the campaign
committee of U.S. Representative Ric Keller (R-FL).'" Keller happens
to be the lead author of the recently introduced "Personal Responsibility
in Food Consumption Act,""' a bill that would significantly shield fast
food companies from tort liability.' 19 Similarly, U.S. Senator Mitch
McConnell (R-KY), who introduced the Senate version of
Representative Keller's Act, received $200,000 in contributions from
the food and beverage industry in 2002 alone.' 91
Aside from lobbying efforts, Congress has perhaps also been
motivated by concerns that regulating fast food menus would adversely
affect the sale of fast food, which, in turn, would adversely affect other
industries. In other words, if Americans consumed less fast food, then
sports arenas, shopping malls, and even public schools would lose
revenue, because those industries frequently lease space to fast food
companies.192 Along these lines, campaign finance reformists believe
that Congress has purposefully avoided initiating effective programs to
counter overeating in the United States. To illustrate, consider that the
1977 Senate report on diet and chronic disease prevention, Dietary
Goals for the United States, remarkably omitted mention of the word
"obesity" and instead heralded such obtuse recommendations as
reducing "energy intake" and raising "energy expenditure." 1
93
Conflicts within executive agencies may also explain the absence of
momentum to require labeling of restaurant food. For instance,
according to Marion Nestle, chair of the Department of Nutrition and
Food Studies at New York University, the USDA is "plagued by
conflicting missions-to promote consumption of American food
188. Tamara Lytle, We're Just Too Darn Fat; Obesity Rivals Tobacco as Top
Preventable Killer in U.S., ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 2004, at At.
189. H.R. 339. The Senate counterpart is the Commonsense Consumption Act,
S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
190. Specifically, the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act would
bar claims against fast food companies for any damages resulting from patrons' obesity.
H.R. 339. Regarding the contributions to U.S. Representative Ric Keller, he received
the fifth largest amount in Congress from this industry for the 2004 election. Lytle,
supra note 188, at Al.
191. McConnell Seeks to Protect Industry Against Fat Lawsuits,
CONGRESSDAILY, July 16, 2003, at 10.
192. See Marion Nestle, Industry, Bureaucrats Stall Fight Against Fat, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, July 10, 2000, at B7.
193. See SELECT COMM. ON NUTRITION & HUMAN NEEDS, U.S. SENATE,
DIETARY GOALS FOR THE UNITED STATES XXXIII-XXXV, at 4 (2d ed. 1977), see also
Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 15 (examining weaknesses of the 1977 report).
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products and to advise the public about diet and health." 94 Since fast
food companies have effectively persuaded the USDA, Professor Nestle
contends that federal antiobesity campaigns to emphasize health have
offered only "bland precepts" that focus on "individual food choices,
not food marketing practices."' ' Moreover, these campaigns typically
extol abstract virtues of "balance, variety, and moderation," and
encourage tritely worded "partnerships and alliances," rather than
simply promote reduced consumption of fattening food.' 96
To demonstrate the institutional ambivalence of the USDA,
consider the National Nutrition Summit, which was hosted by the
USDA, along with several other federal agencies, in May of 2000.197
As part of the Summit's preparation, draft guidelines were developed on
a number of topics, one of which was sugar intake. 9 ' In September
1999, the draft guidelines stated, "'[gbo easy on beverages and foods
high in added sugars."" 99  After complaints by the sugar industry,
however, the February 2000 draft stated, "'[c]hoose beverages and
foods that limit your intake of sugars.'" Finally, when the Summit
announced its publishable set of guidelines, Americans were told to
"'[c]hoose beverages and foods to moderate your intake of sugars."'
201
In other words, after nine months, the phrase "'go easy,"' and the
words, "'added"' and "'limit,"' were all removed. 22
Not surprisingly then, research suggests that consumers often feel
overwhelmed and frustrated by government-procured messages
pertaining to diet and health. In fact, according to a recent study, 40%
of respondents strongly agreed with the statement, "[tihere are so many
recommendations about healthy ways to eat, it's hard to know what to
194. Nestle, supra note 192, at B7. For a historical account of conflict within
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), see generally JEAN MAYER, U.S.
NUTRITION POLICIES IN THE SEVENTIES (1973) (noting the conflict of interest that exists
within the USDA).
195. Nestle, supra note 192, at B7.
196. Id. For these reasons, Professor Nestle contends, "[tihat's why our






202. Id. For another recent example, consider that the Department of Health
and Human Services recently issued a ten-year Healthy People 2010 Plan, which
emphasizes regular exercise and avoiding fatty foods. But, as noted by Nestle and
Jacobson, "the plan offers little guidance as to how the objectives are expected to be
achieved beyond calling for 'a concerted public effort' in that direction." See Nestle &
Jacobson, supra note 7, at 16 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 2




believe." 0 3 As will be explored in the following Part, such equivocal
federal policy has motivated other governmental actors to take matters
of nutritional disclosure into their own hands.
III. VOLUNTARY CONCESSIONS: ASSESSING FREE MARKET INCENTIVES
A. New York Reforms
While the federal government has largely exempted fast food
restaurants from duties to divulge their food's nutritional content, 2°4 the
State of New York, and, in particular, the City of New York, have
attempted to fill the gap through coercing voluntary agreements with fast
food companies. The State of New York has one of the highest rates of
childhood obesity, as 20% of the state's children ages six to nineteen are
overweight.20 5  As a result, New York policymakers have viewed
voluntary agreements as methods to potentially amplify disclosure of fast
food's contents beyond existing legal requirements. From an analytical
standpoint, such agreements prove worthy of exploration, particularly if
market incentives may more efficiently promote nutritional objectives
than would enhanced legislative mandates.
New York began its efforts in 1986, when Attorney General Robert
Abrams, along with the Attorneys General of Texas and California,
reached an agreement with five fast food companies that required them
to supply nutritional brochures and posters in their franchises ("1986
Agreement"). 6 The attorneys general held leverage in this instance, as
Senator John H. Chafee (R-RI) had recently introduced the Fast Food
Ingredient Act of 1986 ("FFIA"), 07 federal legislation that would have
required all fast food restaurants to make ingredient labeling and
nutritional information available to consumers.28 Once the 1986
203. Jayachandran N. Variyam & Elise Golan, New Health Information Is
Reshaping Food Choices, 25 FoODREVIEW 13, 21 (2002).
204. See supra Part II.A.
205. See Duggan, supra note 23, at Al; see also Press Release, Council of the
City of New York, Council Members Quinn and Moskowitz Hear Testimony on
Nutrition in City Schools (June 24, 2003) (noting the surge of childhood obesity in New
York and contending that lawmakers have often ignored remedies), available at
http:/fwww .nyccouncil.infolpdf.filesnewswireljunkfood.pdf.
206. New York City and Burger King Announce Unique Agreement for Nutrition
Disclosure, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 7, 1991 [hereinafter Unique Agreement]. Those
companies were Burger King, McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Wendy's, and Roy
Rogers. See Burros, De Gustibus, supra note 175, at 32.
207. S. 2446, 99th Cong. (1986).
208. Id.; see also 132 CONG. REc. 10,420 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
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Agreement was reached, however, momentum behind FFIA
dissipated. 20 9
Although innovative, the 1986 Agreement failed on two levels.
First, fast food companies typically packaged their "nutritional
brochures" with substantial, and often distracting promotional
information.21 Second, by 1990, less than half of New York City's
Burger King restaurants offered the brochures, and none contained the
posters."' As a simple matter, the agreement was not enforced, and
therefore proved ineffective.
In 1991, New York attempted once again to compel fast food
restaurants into voluntarily revealing their food's nutritional
information. Specifically, Abrams compelled both Kentucky Fried
Chicken and Dunkin' Donuts to desist from airing television
advertisements that falsely characterized certain products as
"healthy."212  To illustrate, consider that Kentucky Fried Chicken
introduced a "Lite'n Crispy" chicken that comprised nearly the same
caloric content as the company's "Original Recipe" chicken.213
However, the Lite'n Crispy chicken was advertised as giving "weight
watchers a new food option."214 Similarly misleading, Dunkin' Donuts
marketed their "0% Cholesterol" donuts as promoting good health,
emphasizing that these donuts were 90% free of saturated fat. 1 5 Yet
because of unsaturated fat content, the "0% Cholesterol" donuts
contained approximately the same percentage of fat as the company's
regular donuts.216
In response to persistent demands from the New York Attorney
General's Office, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Dunkin' Donuts canceled
their advertisements.2 " More significantly, however, neither company
admitted any wrongdoing and Kentucky Fried Chicken continued to sell
209. See John H. Chafee, Letter to the Editor, Putting Some Teeth into Fast
Food Regulation, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1996, at A26 (Senator John H. Chafee intimating
that the nutritional brochures were introduced as insufficient remedies to concerns
articulated by FFIA). Also, Chafee unsuccessfully reintroduced this bill in 1988. See
Rob Wright, ST. NEws SERVICE, Jan. 6, 1988.
210. See Wat's in McNuggets? We'll Know Soon, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., July 14,
1986, at 74.
211. Trish Hall, How Fat? Burger King to Post Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1991, at B2.




216. See Frederick M. Winship, N.Y. Stops Fast Food Companies' "Phony"
Health Claims, UPI, Oct. 30, 1991. In addition, regular donuts contained only two
milligrams of cholesterol, which is considered dietarily insignificant. Riley, supra note
143, at C3.
217. Riley, supra note 143, at C3.
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and promote its product in other parts of the country under the "Lite'n
Crispy" label.218
Similarly noteworthy, 1991 also featured a voluntary agreement
between the City of New York and Burger King.2 9 Specifically, Burger
King committed to prominently display large posters in its eighty New
York City restaurants, and those posters would indicate the caloric
content of frequently ordered meals. 2° Of course, Burger King, along
with four other fast food restaurants, had espoused a similar promise in
1986, only to subsequently fail to honor such an obligation. 22'
Consequently, it came as little surprise to see this latter agreement yield
marginal effectiveness. 2
New York's ability to persuade fast food companies into voluntarily
revealing nutritional information reveals certain intrinsic characteristics
in voluntary agreements, particularly in the context of fast food
nutritional labeling. As a primary advantage, they allow individual fast
food companies to tailor the means by which they disclose their dishes'
nutritional content. In doing so, these companies may more effectively
transmit information than they would upon complying with static,
sometimes defeasible regulations.223 Indeed, with voluntary agreements,
the negotiation framework between industry and government enables
company management to directly participate in the creation of
objectives.22 In contrast, with regulations, it is generally difficult to
impose nuanced targets that incorporate the market variances of each
company.
Second, voluntary agreements may generate faster and more
efficient achievement of nutritional disclosure objectives than would
218. See id.
219. See Hall, supra note 211, at B2.
220. Id.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 206-11.
222. Id.
223. For instance, since more than half of Burger King's sales derive through
the drive-through window, this company could focus its nutritional disclosure resources
toward those customers most likely to use the drive-through window. See Company A-
Z: Facts and Figures on the Top Firms, CATERER & HOTELKEEPER MAG., at
http://www.caterer-online.com/facts/companydetail.asp?lSiteSectionlD = 19&companyI
D=21152 (last modified July 6, 2004). This is a benefit often associated with voluntary
environmental agreements. See infra note 227.
224. See PHILIPPE MENANTEAU, CAN NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS REPLACE
EFFICIENCY STANDARDS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR TRANSFORMING THE ELECTRICAL
APPLIANCE MARKET? § 4.1 (UNIVERSITt PIERRE MENDLS FRANCE, INSTITUT D'ECONOMIE
ET DE POLITIQUE DE L'ENERGIE, Research Paper No. 28(a), 2002), available at
http://www.upmf-grenoble.fr/iepe/textes/Cahier28Angl.pdf. For an application of
voluntary agreements to the health care setting, see generally I. Glenn Cohen,
Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
253 (2004).
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traditional command-and-control legislation. This is true because
certain industries evince greater and a more sustained initiative to
engage in cooperative arrangements. 225  Along these lines, because
commitments are partly self-monitored by participating companies,
governmental administration and monitoring costs are often reduced. 6
These benefits have proven especially manifest in voluntary agreements
between the federal government and environmental polluters, and
therefore, may hold similar promise in the context of fast food and
nutritional disclosure. 227
Third, voluntary agreements may foment change in public policy.
Such a phenomenon occurred in New York City, as shortly after Burger
King agreed to display nutritional posters, the Fast Food Ingredient
Disclosure Ordinance of 1991 ("FFID") 2 ' was proposed. FFID would
have required other fast food restaurants to follow the lead of Burger
King, and it would have marked the first law in the country to mandate
the furnishing of nutritional information for fast food dishes."s Despite
225. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM. OF DOMESTIC EQuIP. MFG., CRITIQUE OF THE
WHITE PAPER ON GOVERNANCE 5 (2002) (applying efficiency benefits to manufacturing
interests); Michael Boudin, Regulation and Competition, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1098, 1100
(1982) (noting arguments supporting the adaptation of federal antitrust law to eschew
regulation and accommodate voluntary arrangements).
226. Menanteau, supra note 224, § 4.1.
227. In the context of environmental pollution, the prospect of avoiding
litigation often compels polluters into voluntarily remedying excessive pollution. See,
e.g., Joseph A. Fischer, All CERCLA Plaintiffs Are Not Created Equal: Private Parties,
Settlements, and the UCATA, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1979, 1994 (1994). This is especially
evident in the oil tanker industry. See Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and
International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 135 n.331 (2001).
228. N.Y. City, N.Y., Ordinance 766 (proposed Aug. 15, 1991).
229. Unique Agreement, supra note 206. Specifically, Fast Food Ingredient
Disclosure Ordinance ("FFID") would have required fast food restaurants to:
1.. Conspicuously display an easy-to-read poster that shows the levels of
calories, fat and sodium of major menu items. The poster will use a bar
chart designed to show at a glance what percentages of the recommended
daily maximum for these three components the food contains. The poster
must include at least four breakfasts and four lunches/dinners, the least fatty
and most fatty meals plus two in between.
2. Use trayliners at least half the times that a) disclose the same health-
related information as the poster or; b) that feature the healthiest menu items
offered by the restaurant and contain advice on how to select menu items to
reduce fat, sodium and calories.
3. Make available a brochure containing detailed ingredient and nutrition
information for every item of food listed on the price menu board.
4. Include on their price menu boards a message that advises customers to
read the poster and brochures for important health and ingredient
information.
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favorable support from health advocates, however, the ordinance did not
advance.23
On the other hand, voluntary arrangements between fast food
companies and governmental entities suffer from inherent flaws. For
one, they are often implemented on an ad hoc basis, whereby some
restaurants agree to cooperate, while others do not. To illustrate,
consider, as one observer notes, "McDonald's has a number of high-fat,
high-calorie menu items, but the only reason we know that for certain is
because of its corporate policy of freely sharing that information."231 In
contrast, other fast food companies require written request before
divulging their foods' nutritional content, thus "making quick decisions
impossible." 232 Given that fast food is supposed to be "fast," having to
draft written requests for nutritional information appears functionally
inconsistent.
Similarly, voluntary agreements must involve widespread market
participation for discernable consumer benefit. That is, if only Burger
King agrees to reveal its dishes' nutritional content, and to only do so in
New York, patrons of all other fast food restaurants remain uninformed.
Indeed, pause to consider Kentucky Fried Chicken's response to
voluntarily refraining from advertising the "Lite'n Crispy" sandwich in
New York: it proceeded to market that product in other states, without
apparent deterrence.233
Voluntary arrangements may also produce inconsistent results. For
instance, McDonald's may utilize one method of revealing dietary
information, while Burger King can employ a completely different
standard. Along these lines, without any federal standard, fast food
Id. Failure to comply with the law would result in fines of up to $5000, plus
additional fines of up to $100 for each day the violation was not corrected.
Ordinance 766 § 20-762.
According to Michael Jacobson, executive director of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest, FFID represented a "breakthrough" and an ordinance that "represents
the most effective way yet ... for fast-food restaurants to provide useful information to
their customers .... [It] will especially benefit those who eat fast food regularly."
Unique Agreement, supra note 206. For a general discussion on the political
machinations associated with FFID, see Pat Natschke Lenius, Burger King Beefing Up
Label Data, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Aug. 19, 1991, at 41.
230. The failure of FFID was largely due to extensive opposition by the fast
food industry. Unique Agreement, supra note 206.
231. Don Mauer, Editorial, Nutritional Labeling: We Need More of It, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, Mar. 21, 2001, at 4 (emphasis added). Along these lines, consider that
to the extent fast food companies offer nutritional information online, they often do so in
widely varied formats and incomplete manners. See supra Part II.B.
232. Mauer, supra note 231, at 4. This parrots findings by the FTC that
consumers often find limited value in nutritional disclosure after the point of sale. See
supra Part II.B.
233. See Riley, supra note 143, at C3.
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companies may communicate nutritional information in distractingly
promotional ways, such as McDonald's "nutrition brochures" from the
late 1980s.2 4
Perhaps the greatest conceptual weakness of voluntary agreements
with fast food companies has concerned enforcement, or lack thereof.
As discussed, despite initial praise for the 1986 Agreement between
New York and five fast food companies, less than half of New York
City restaurants offered the brochures by 1991, and none contained the
posters. 35 Moreover, given the inability of any level of elective body-
be it federal, state, or local-to require nutritional labeling from
restaurants, voluntary agreements with fast food companies may lack the
essential "threat" that renders voluntary agreements in other instances
meaningful: lurking behind the call for effective voluntary compliance
must be the potential that what is now voluntary may become
compulsory.236 Therefore, the underlying assumption that cooperation
between government entities and fast food companies works better than
deterrence proves unconvincing, at least to date .237
234. For a contemporary example, note that display posters containing food
nutritional content are usually scant or too difficult to understand. See T.H. Shrenk,
Mission Nutrition, RESTAURANT Bus., May 15, 2004, LEXIS, News & Business, Wire
Service Stories, Bus. WIRE. Also consider comments by Michael Jacobson (voluntary
agreements often lead to "'[a] couple of companies hanging up posters that are a mass of
numbers"'). Hall, supra note 211, at B2.
235. Hall, supra note 211, at B2.
236. See Mary Durfee, Diffusion of Pollution Prevention Policy, 566 ANNALS
108, 112 (1999) (explaining the value of deterrence in environmental voluntary
agreements, in that firms tend to control greenhouse gas emissions only if they fear more
costly mandatory controls in the absence of these voluntary reductions); see also Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1257 (1998) (noting that penalties must change
the cost-uenefit analysis of polluters; otherwise, the penalties accomplish little); Major
Mark R. Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Environmental Offenses Committed
Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No", 40 A.F. L. REV. 1, 47
(contemplating use of international criminal law to buttress deterrence of environmental
voluntary agreements).
237. This is likewise a problem concerning the environmental benefits of
voluntary agreements between government entities and corporate polluters. See, e.g.,
David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to
Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 38 & n.227
(2001); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National
Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CH. LEGAL F. 293, 302 (1997)
(examining voluntary agreements in the context of greenhouse gas emissions). The
conceptual limitations of the New York fast food reforms are perhaps manifest today, as
a proposed $350,000 obesity study was recently deemed "nonessential" by the New
York Assembly, and thus removed from the state's budget. See Duggan, supra note 23,
at Al. On the other hand, New York Assemblyman Felix Ortiz, who chairs a task force
on food, farm, and nutrition policy, recently introduced Assembly Bill 5520, an Act to
Amend the Public Health Law, in Relation to the Posting of Caloric Value,
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B. The Implicit Notification Function of Light Menus
Unlike voluntary agreements, light menus have become common,
albeit indirect, mechanisms for fast food companies to voluntarily signal
their food's nutritional content. Since these menus have been introduced
for purposes of generating profits, they reflect market preferences,
rather than governmental impositions. Therefore, it is worth exploring
whether industry incentives for communicating nutritional information
may potentially render unnecessary any modification of the NLEA.
Selections from light menus are familiar to most. They typically
include lower-fat versions of regular menu items, such as low-fat shakes
and lower-fat hamburgers, and they became especially popular in the
early 1990s, partly in response to a larger societal demand for more
health-conscious lifestyle choices,238 and partly in response to pressure
from health-conscious groups.239 In fact, from 1990 to 1997, fast food
restaurants increasingly offered healthier menu choices. 2' At about the
same time, fast food companies affirmatively altered their business
model in order to appear more health conscious. For instance, many
fast food restaurants switched from saturated to unsaturated fat for
frying, and some removed the beef fat from french fries as well.24
Light menus, however, have generally not excelled at attracting
customers. 242  Taco Bell, for instance, tried the "Border Light"
Carbohydrate, Fat and Sodium Content of Food Items. Assemb. B. 5520, 225th Leg.,
1st Sess. (N.Y. 2003). The bill would require fast food and other restaurant chains to
list fat, caloric, and sodium levels for items on their menu boards or regular menus. See
infra Part V; see also Jon D. Lichtenstein, The Case Against McDonald's: Teens Take
On Corporate Giant, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 2003, at 4-5 (offering a discussion of
Assembly Bill 5220).
238. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., A Fitness Classic, 106 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 600, 600 (1991) (demonstrating the increased fitness activity of the early
1990s); see also Paul J. Corcoran, Use It or Lose It-The Hazards of Bed Rest and
Inactivity, 154 W.J. MED. 536, 536-38 (1991) (noting heightened awareness for the
rehabilitation value of more frequent exercise).
239. See Burklow & Aubertin, supra note 46, at 326. Bonnie Liebman, director
of nutrition at the Center for Science in the Public Interest, states that "[flast food is still
not healthy, but if we keep the pressure on, the trend will continue." Id. See also Betsy
D. Gelb & John Michael Bryant, Minicase: Designing Health Promotion Programs by
Watching the Market, 12 J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING 65 (1992) (presenting study on
market incentives for health-conscious groups to promote good health).
240. See Burklow & Aubertin, supra note 46, at 325.
241. Id. (noting that restaurants have also reduced the fat in the mayonnaise by
50%). On the other hand, most fast food restaurants still use trans-fatty acids when
cooking food. See Wild Oats Markets Removes All Products Containing Hydrogenated
Oils, HEART DISEASE WKLY., Mar. 14, 2004, at 73.
242. See Astrid Van Den Broeck, The Research Behind the McLaunch,
STRATEGY, July 15, 2002, at 30 (studying how fast food companies have internalized
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campaign in the early 1990s, featuring low-fat tacos and burritos, but
customers preferred the more fattening and undoubtedly better tasting,
options." Customers also avoided Kentucky Fried Chicken's skinless
fried chicken, as well as Pizza Hut's low-calorie pizzas./ Perhaps the
most infamous example was McDonald's "McLean Deluxe," which was
introduced in 1991 as the low-calorie alternative to the "Big Mac.
245
Although McDonald's expended $70 million promoting the McLean
Deluxe in 1991, the company ceased marketing the item by 1992, and
discontinued it by 1997.7
Given the inability of light menu items to attract the appetites of
fast food patrons, fast food companies have typically resisted
suggestions to add new "healthy" options. For instance, while several
health groups campaigned for McDonald's to introduce a "veggie
burrito" dish, McDonald's repeatedly refused, simply because it did not
project well in sales. 8  Likewise, Hardee's, which introduced a
reduced-fat hamburger in 1990 only to remove it after insufficient sales,
previous market miscalculations on consumer interest in low-fat food); see also Mark
Johnson & John Fauber, Obesity Changing Food Industry, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Dec. 21, 2003, at 1A (noting how fast food companies greatly overestimated consumer
interest in healthy food during the 1990s). On the other hand, some light menu
selections have proven successful, such as Arby's "Roast Chicken Deluxe" and "Roast
Chicken Santa Fe Sandwich." See The Ultimate Irony: Fast Food as an Ally in the
Battle of the Bulge; Arby's Extensive Light Menu Part of Low Fat Diet, PR NEWSWIRE,
Dec. 2, 1999.
243. See Su-Jin Yim, Healthy Food Doesn't Appeal to Diners: Fast-Food
Restaurants Give Menus Fat Chance, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 1997, at
Dl. In fact, by 1998, Taco Bell had discontinued their campaign, while adding the
"Gordita" entr6e, which is Spanish for "little fatty." Patricia Alex, Interest in Low Fat
Foods Is Waning, RECORD, Feb. 1, 1999, at HI.
244. Paul Farhi, Low-Fat Fast-Food Figures to Be a Flop, WASH. POST, Apr.
18, 1992, at D10.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Allen, supra note 48, at Cl; see also John Przybys, Quick Nutrition:
Healthy Choices Can Be Found at Fast-Food Joints, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 27,
1997, at El (noting the effort put in by McDonald's in promoting the McLean Deluxe).
Notably, one observer posits that the remarkable failure of the McLean Deluxe
prompted McDonald's to introduce its most fattening selection of dishes in 1996. See
Fast Food: Fatter than Ever, CONSUMER REP. ON HEALTH, Aug. 1996, at 85. Even
some of the successful "healthy" options do not qualify as "healthy." Although not
billed as a healthy option, Denny's offers a veggie burger, and it is conspicuously
located near traditionally "healthy" options, such as salads and pitas, on the menu. Yet
the veggie burger contains 665 calories and thirty-three grams of fat. Mitch Lipka, Hold
the Taco Salad if Losing Weight Is Goal, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 5,
2000, at 6B.
248. See Allen, supra note 48, at C1. In fact, according to a company
spokesman, "'[t]he hamburger continues to be the flagship sandwich. We have to be
responsive to our customers.'" Id.
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concluded in an internal study: "[affter spending millions on research,
we found, just by listening to the consumer, that people are talking
nutrition, but they buy on taste."29  Other industry examinations
corroborate this point: fast food patrons make their selections primarily
on the basis of perceived taste, rather than price or health
implications .2 Not surprisingly, therefore, only 30% of consumers
claim that they have eaten less fats, oils or red meat since the
implementation of light menus."'
Despite the market insufficiencies of light menus, their mere
presence may serve an important theoretical function when assessing the
effectiveness of current nutritional labeling requirements: simply by
offering "light" or "low fat" items, fast food restaurants may implicitly
signal to their patrons that their regular items are neither "light" nor
"low fat." As a result, the existence of "healthy" items may
communicate (albeit in general, noncomparative terms) the nutritional
content of regular items. If so, then those who consume regular items
knowingly eat fattening foods, thus diminishing the need for labeling
disclosure.
Two factors, however, limit the implicit notification function of
light menus. First, light menu selections fail to illuminate the extent to
which those selections are less fattening than regular selections, since
regular selections may be offered without nutritional disclosure.
Therefore, while a customer may obviously recognize that a low-fat
salad menu item is less fattening than a double cheeseburger, the
customer remains unaware of the precise fat content of that double
cheeseburger. Perhaps more troubling, the absence of nutritional
disclosure may delude the more health-conscious customer into selecting
the wrong item. For example, a Burger King patron may select a veggie
burger rather than a hamburger because she perceives that the former
would prove a healthier selection. Absent requesting nutritional
information from the store, however, she remains unaware that Burger
King's veggie burger actually contains three more grams of fat than its
hamburger. 2 Thus, the consumer fails to make an informed decision,
249. See People Talk Lean Hamburgers but Buy Fatty Patties, CI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1992, at 38 (emphasis added) (quoting Maurice Bridges, director of public
affairs for Hardee's).
250. See Alex, supra note 243, at HI (quoting Marvin Spira, executive director
of the Eastern Perishable Products Association). A similar finding was made by Bonnie
Briggs of NPD Crest, a market research firm: fast food consumers often state a
preference for healthy fast food items while participating in focus groups, but then
purchase fattening foods when they actually frequent fast food restaurants. See Martin
Zimmerman, Low-Fat Foodstuffs Fail to Bring Home the Bacon for Restaurants, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZMTE, Mar. 20, 1996, at 4E.
251. Alex, supra note 243, at HI.
252. Derived by comparing a veggie burger with regular mayo to a hamburger,
1206
Nutritional Labeling
and she remains oblivious to the nutritional content of these items as
well.
Second, children may not infer the same comparative insight that
adults infer from light menus. In fact, studies consistently find that most
children fail to develop deductive reasoning skills until they are twelve
to fifteen years old.253 As a result, the implicit notification function of
light menus appears especially muted for such younger patrons.'
Collectively, analysis pertaining to light menus suggests that fast
food patrons generally prefer regular menu options, and by deducing
that the mere presence of "healthy" fast food choices signals to adults
that regular menu choices are not "healthy," it may be postulated that
adult fast food patrons are, at least to a certain degree, knowingly eating
foods of relatively high caloric and fat content. Children patrons of fast
food restaurants, on the other hand, likely do not derive the same insight
from light menus. In part for that very reason, the prospect of children
patrons "blaming" fast food companies for their obesity and related
diseases appears more plausible than it would in the context of adult
patrons. The following Part evaluates the viability of such blame, and
how it impacts the underlying fundaments of nutritional labeling.
IV. OBESITY-RELATED JURISPRUDENCE: DUTY AND ECONOMIC
UNPREDICTABILITY
A. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp.
In 2003, the entire fast food industry appeared threatened by two
obese New York City teens, Ashley Pelman and Jazlyn Bradley, who
were plaintiffs in the first obesity class action lawsuit against a fast food
restaurant to reach the stage of a dispositive motion. In Pelman v.
McDonald's Corp., the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all
minors residing in New York State who purchased and consumed
per data from http://www.bk.com/food/nutrition/nutritionwizard/index.aspx (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004).
253. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 123, at 654-55 (interpreting JEAN PIAGET,
JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD (1928)); see also James H. Bray, Psychosocial
Factors Affecting Custodial and Visitation Arrangements, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 419, 427
(1991); Linda Whobrey Rohman et al., The Best Interests of the Child in Custody
Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 59, 75 (Lois A.
Weithorn ed., 1987).
254. However, upon further inspection, such a limitation appears less
meaningful since parents tend to select or greatly influence the food consumption of
children. See supra Part I.E.
255. Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 518. Judge Sweet noted that Pelman is "the
first of its kind to progress far enough along to reach the stage of a dispositive motion."
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McDonald's products, only to become obese and gravely ill, allegedly
due to the consumption of the products. 6 Intriguingly, the Pelman case
raises the prospect that litigation, rather than legislation or market
incentives, may most efficiently enhance nutritional notification.
Paradoxically, Pelman may also highlight conceptual restraints within
the American tort system that discount such lawsuits as fundamentally
misguided.
Pelman featured three core claims, sounding in negligence,
products liability, and unfair business practices under New York law:
(1) McDonald's misled the plaintiffs, through deceptive marketing
campaigns, that its food products were nutritious and part of a healthy
lifestyle if consumed on a daily basis; (2) McDonald's failed to disclose
health risks associated with its products, and had the plaintiffs known
those risks, they would not have regularly eaten McDonald's products;
and (3) McDonald's engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices
by erroneously representing that it provides nutritional brochures and
information at all of its stores. 7 Conceptually, these claims averred the
premise that consumption of McDonald's products causes obesity and
related conditions, such as diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood
pressure, and elevated cholesterol, and that McDonald's should bear a
duty to warn customers of these potential consequences. 58
U.S. Federal District Court Judge Robert W. Sweet dismissed the
complaint in January 2003, however, reasoning that the teens' own
choices caused their obesity, that McDonald's bore no duty to protect
citizens from "their own excesses," 2 9 and that consumption of
McDonald's products failed to implicate any danger outside "the
common knowledge of consumers. "2 Despite the dismissal, Judge
Sweet granted the plaintiffs leave to replead the complaint with greater
specificity, and he noted the potential strength of the products liability
claim, particularly if it could be shown that McDonald's created a more
dangerous food than a consumer could reasonably expect.261
256. Id. at 512, 516. The two teens were Ashley Pelman, 14, and Jazlyn
Bradley, 19. Pelman stood 4'10" and weighed 170 pounds while Bradley stood 5'6"
and weighed 270 pounds. Benjamin Weiser, Big Macs Can Make You Fat? No
Kidding, a Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at B3.
257. Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527-33.
258. See id. For a further account of these claims, see generally Lichtenstein,
supra note 237.
259. Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 517-18, 533 ("If consumers know (or
reasonably should know) the potential ill health effects of eating at [McDonald's], they
cannot blame [McDonald's] if they, nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite with a
surfeit of supersized [McDonald's] products.").
260. Id. at 517, 523.
261. Id. at 531-32, 542-43.
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The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in February 2003,
supplying greater specificity to the products liability claim, including
rather audacious testimony by McDonald's officials concerning their
products' nutritional values. 262  Nevertheless, the case was dismissed
with prejudice in September 2003.63 Specifically, as Judge Sweet
concluded, "[t]he plaintiffs have made no explicit allegations that they
witnessed any particular deceptive advertisement, and they have not
provided McDonald's with enough information to determine whether its
products are the cause of the alleged injuries." 2"
B. Determining the Existence and Desirability of a Legal Duty to Warn of
Nutritional Content
The difficulties encountered by the Pelman plaintiffs shed light on
the challenges of employing tort and product liability law to remedy
possible harm caused by the consumption of fast food, particularly when
compared with other product liability class actions. Indeed, class
actions have successfully remedied injury caused by such products as
cigarettes,265 asbestos,266 diet drugs,267 and silicone breast implants.
262. For example, the plaintiffs quoted McDonald's chief nutritionist, Ann
Rusniak, who claimed that it is possible to eat at McDonald's "three times a day,
everyday" and have a healthy diet. Am. Brief for Plaintiff at 33, Pelman v.
McDonald's, No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS), 2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003)
("Pelman IF'). The plaintiffs also quoted McDonald's spokesman Walt Riker as stating:
"[Elating McDonald's food can easily fit into a balanced diet. I eat its food every day,
and I'm perfectly healthy." Id.
263. Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *15. Note also that in April 2003,
Judge Sweet declined to expand the class to include a middle-aged woman with a similar
passion for McDonald's products. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 215 F.R.D. 96, 97,
100 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reasoning that a forty-three-year-old woman failed to establish
that the plaintiffs' lawsuit cannot continue without her). Under Rule 19(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party should be joined only if: (1) in the party's absence, the
court cannot grant complete relief among those already parties; (2) the absent party
claims an interest related to the action and is so situated that disposition of the action
without that party may impair its ability to protect its interests; or (3) failing to join the
absent party subjects parties already in the litigation to a substantial risk of double
liability or otherwise inconsistent obligations. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see also Johnson
v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 19(a)).
264. Petman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14.
265. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that tobacco companies
orchestrated a scheme to distort public knowledge concerning risks of smoking).
266. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997)
(affirming denial of certification of class of potentially millions who had suffered injuries
due to asbestos exposure).
267. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002) (addressing injunction arising out of a
class action of six million who took "diet drugs" that were later linked to vascular heart
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Yet, unlike the danger posed by those products, the potential danger of
fast food may prove immune from the American tort system, primarily
because of the following: (1) an unclear duty on the part of fast food
companies to "protect" their patrons from overconsumption; (2) the
probable assumption of risk by patrons when knowingly eating fattening
foods; and (3) a murky causation between fast food products, possible
malfeasance on the part of fast food companies, and the patrons'
ultimate ailments. The following subsections will evaluate these
perplexities, and assess how they might help furnish optimal
communication of nutritional information.
1. COMMON LAW DUTY TO WARN OR ASSUMPTION OF RISK BY
OVERCONSUMPTION?
In any cause of action in tort or products liability, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: (1) a duty recognized by the law requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of
that duty by the defendant; (3) a legal causation between the breach of
that duty and the plaintiff's resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage suffered by the plaintiff. 269 This Subsection will ponder whether
the law might impose a legal duty on the part of fast food companies to
inform their customers of their products' nutritional content or the
potential consequences of using those products or, alternatively, whether
these patrons simply assume the risk of eating fast food.
Duty, in the context of the law, can be described simply as
behavior which the law requires be done or forborne. For instance, a
driver of an automobile has the legal duty to drive within the posted
speed limit. Often, duty appears contextual, and the legal significance
of two separate, yet identical actions can vary entirely on circumstance.
For instance, consider the physical act of touching another person. In
the famed Vosburg v. Putney, the court held, inter alia, that students
bear a duty to avoid touching one another during class.270 In contrast,
disease).
268. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 959-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing possibility of transfer of thousands of cases alleging
injuries from silicone breast implants).
269. See, e.g., La.-Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1580 (9th Cir.
1994) ("The essential elements of a products liability claim under Washington law are
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damage or injury."). For a general discussion of
the elements of a torts or products liability claim, see WILLIAM L. PROSSER E7 AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
270. 80 Wis. 523, 527-28, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (1891).
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Mohr v. Williams demonstrates that surgeons possess no duty to avoid
touching patients during surgery. t '
Duty may be imposed by common law or by statute.272 Whether a
common law duty exists depends upon the foreseeability of injury, and
whether measures are needed to avert that which a reasonable person
under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to happen.273
Alternatively, a statutory duty arises whenever the plaintiff is a member
of the class of persons that a statute was enacted to protect.274 To
illustrate the distinction between these two forms of duty, consider that a
physician's statutory duty is typically to follow the regulations and
statutes governing the medical profession and to do so with reasonable
care and skill, while her common law duty requires her to practice to the
same standard as does the reasonably competent physician.275
As illustrated in Pelman, obesity-related class actions turn on
whether fast food companies carry a duty to warn consumers that
consumption of their products may cause an addiction, which in turn
may prompt overconsumption of those products, thereby triggering
obesity and obesity-related disease. For two reasons, however, neither
federal nor state law prescribes a statutory duty to warn. First,
scientific evidence of addictive elements contained in fast food appears
speculative, and largely unconvincing. Although recent studies have
identified a correlation between weight gain and hormonal modifications
that may impair one's ability to control eating," no such precise
271. See 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905). Naturally, however, there are certain
limits to a surgeon's "touching" during surgery. For instance, a surgeon performing an
appendectomy would exceed the boundaries of informed consent if she injures the arm of
the patient during surgery. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944).
272. See, e.g., Albers v. Ottenbacher, 116 N.W.2d 529, 531 (S.D. 1962)
(noting both the statutory and common law forms of duties).
273. See, e.g., Guillory ex rel. Guillory v. United States, 699 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir. 1983) ("[A] hospital is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard
the patient from any known or reasonably apprehensible danger from himself and to
exercise such reasonable care for his safety as his mental and physical condition, if
known, may require."); Mounds Park Hosp. v. Von Eye, 245 F.2d 756, 764 (8th Cir.
1957) (stipulating that "no one is required to guard against or take measures to avert that
which a reasonable person under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to
happen").
274. See Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mkt., Inc., 951 P.2d 749, 754 (Wash. 1998).
275. See Michael A. McCann, Message Deleted? Resolving Physician-Patient
E-mail Through Contract Law, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 112-15 (2002-2003)
(explaining the duties of physicians).
276. More specifically, as people put on weight, they become more resistant to
the hormone leptin, which is linked to weight and appetite, and the brain peptide
galanin, which stimulates eating. Leptin releases signals to the part of the brain that
coordinates eating behavior, but as people gain weight they become more resistant to the
effects of the hormone. Reuters, Addictive Idea Chewed Over. CALGARY SUN, Jan. 30,
2003, at 26; see also Michael Rosenbaum & Rudolph L. Leibel, The Physiology of Body
2004:1161 1211
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
correlation between fast food consumption and hormonal or other bodily
changes has been recognized.277 Second, as discussed in Part II, NLEA
explicitly exempts restaurants from the burden of disclosing the
nutritional content of their dishes, absent suggestion that a particular
dish promotes health.278  Likewise, no state government has yet to
impose labeling restrictions. 279 Therefore, neither federal nor state law
assigns to fast food companies a statutory burden to reveal the "risks" of
overconsuming regular fast food meals, as those products are not
marketed as promoting good health.
Although fast food restaurants have likely complied with statutory
duties prescribed by federal and state law, they may nevertheless have a
state common law duty to warn patrons of the nutritional content of their
food. The following analytical questions may help identify or dismiss
the existence of a common law duty on the part of fast food companies
to warn customers of the nutritional content of their food.
a. Inadequate Awareness or Assumption of Risk?
As a general matter, injuries arising from a food manufacturer's
failure to provide adequate warnings of health risks associated with its
food products are recoverable whenever food manufacturers are aware
or should have been aware of these potential risks. For instance, in
Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc., a restaurant chain was held liable
for selling vegetable soup containing undisclosed monosodium
glutamate, a controversial food additive. 280 Likewise, in Barry v. Don
Hall Laboratories, an Oregon court held a manufacturer liable for
failing to warn that excessive sugar content within a popular vitamin
product can lead to tooth decay.2
81
On the other hand, modem tort law recognizes that consumption of
food inherently involves a tolerable degree of risk.2n This principle is
Weight Regulation: Relevance to the Etiology of Obesity in Children, 101 PEDIATRICS
525, 530-31 (1998) (explaining scientific link between obesity and hormonal changes).
277. See Buchholz, supra note 46, at 6, 19 (presenting a recent-and potentially
biased-study commissioned by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which concluded,
"[fast food] meals ... are not chemically addictive").
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. See supra Part iI.A.
280. 85 Cal. 2d 528, 529 (Ct. App. 1999); cf. Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624
So. 2d 1065, 1068-69 (Ala. 1993) (holding a grocer liable for selling food containing
undisclosed sulfites).
281. 642 P.2d 685, 688 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
282. This concept is perhaps best articulated by section 402A of the Restatement
Second of Torts: "[miany products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all
consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 282, § 402A cmt. i.
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also called the "common knowledge" doctrine,s 3 which posits that a
product shall not be deemed unreasonably dangerous when its inherent
dangers are commonly known.2" For instance, courts consider as
common knowledge that eating uncooked pork may prove hazardous.285
Working in tandem with the common knowledge doctrine is the
principle of "assumption of risk," which dictates that a person who
voluntarily exposes himself to a known risk forfeits the opportunity to
recover for injuries sustained as a result of that exposure.2 86  Put
differently, by taking the chance of injury from a known risk, the
plaintiff consents to relieve the defendant of its duty toward him.2"
283. A similar, if not identical, principal of the common knowledge doctrine is
the "patent danger" rule. This rule dictates that "when the defects in ... a product's
design were obvious ... the manufacturer could not be held liable for injuries that
resulted." See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 200-
01 (2d ed. 2002). See generally Stanton G. Darling II, The Patent Danger Rule: An
Analysis and a Survey of its Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583 (1978) (discussing the
patent danger rule). The case most identified with the patent danger rule was Campo v.
Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950). However, this rule has been overruled in many
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1170-72
(Fla. 1979) (holding that patent danger rule was replaced by comparative negligence);
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976).
284. See Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 2d 797, 810-12 (N.D.
Iowa 2000) (expressing common knowledge doctrine).
285. See, e.g., Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc., 559 P.2d 1074, 1077
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); cf. Raschke v. Carier Corp., 703 P.2d 556, 559 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985) (affirming summary judgment for gas furnace manufacturer because it is common
knowledge that adequate ventilation is required for the furnace's proper operation);
Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750, 756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of electrical extension cord manufacturer because it is
common knowledge that frayed or cut electrical cords pose a dangerous threat to people
who use them); Durkee v. Cooper of Can., Ltd., 298 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Mich. 1980)
(noting that failure to warn of apparent danger may be regarded as inconsequential).
286. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Chemetals Inc., 17 Fed. Appx. 325, 329 (6th Cir.
2001) (holding that assumption of risk is evident if plaintiff was aware of risk or risk
was inherent in his line of work); Little v. United States, No. 98-1835, 1999 WL
381822, at **7 (4th Cir. June 11, 1999) (noting that "[i]n order to establish assumption
of risk, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff: '(1) had knowledge of the risk of the
danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger")
(quoting ADM P'ship v. Martin, 702 A.2d 730, 734 (Md. 1997)); Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1965). But see Little, 1999 WL
381822, at **7 (reasoning that the plaintiff's awareness of the "general risk" of sitting
on concrete tables was not sufficient to satisfy the assumption of risk when the plaintiff
was not aware that the specific table was dangerous).
,287. Wagner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 890 F.2d 652, 657 (3d Cir.
1989); see also Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 431 F.2d 371, 373-75 (3d Cir. 1970)
(dictating that assumption of risk is based on the notion that, by taking the chance of
injury from a known risk, the plaintiff has consented to relieve the defendant of its duty
toward him); Staymates v. ITT Holub Indus., 527 A.2d 140, 146 (Pa. 1987) (finding
that the basis of assumption of risk is consent to accept the risk); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 282, § 496C cmt. h. (stating that the conduct "must be
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Typically, courts identify the presence of assumption of risk whenever
"a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff"' would
have understood the danger.2 For instance, a person who knowingly
consumes a glass of hot chocolate assumes the risk of injury resulting
from the drink's temperature.289
The concepts of common knowledge and assumption of risk
influence the plausibility of obesity-related claims against fast food
companies. On one hand, since fast food companies bear no statutory
duty to furnish nutritional information,2" some of their patrons may
theoretically fail to recognize that consumption of such food may
contribute to obesity and disease. On the other hand, Pelman held that
McDonald's owed no duty to prevent its customers from "their own
excesses" 9 -language which distinctly alludes to section 496 of the
Restatement Second of Torts-to imply assumption of risk from the
plaintiff's conduct, the conduct "must be such as fairly to indicate that
the plaintiff is willing to take his chances." 292  Perhaps equally
meaningful, the American public largely believes that fast food patrons
are "taking their chances." 293 In fact, according to one recent study of
American attitudes toward obesity and fast food consumption, 7.1% of
Americans contend that, "[i]f people are overweight, it is their own
fault" while only 2.9% regard the influence of fast food companies as
such as fairly to indicate that the plaintiff is willing to take his chances").
288. Stolting v. Jolly Roger Amusement Park, Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 80, 84 (4th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Schroyer v. McNeal, 592 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Md. 1991)); see also
Schroyer, 592 A.2d at 1123 (affirming objective analysis for use of assumption of risk
defense); Fish v. Gosnell, 463 A.2d 1042, 1048 (Pa. 1983) (noting that defendant must
produce evidence that the plaintiff fully understood the specific risk, and yet voluntarily
chose to encounter it).
289. See, e.g., McCroy v. Coastal Mart, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1277-78
(D. Kan. 2002) (finding that a seller of hot chocolate was not liable for failing to warn
that hot chocolate is, in fact, hot, since "[t]here is no duty to warn of dangers actually
known to the user of a product") (quoting Brand v. Mazda Motor Corp., 978 F. Supp.
1382, 1389 (D. Kan. 1997). For an illustration outside the context of food, see Coln v.
City of Savannah, 966 S.W.2d 34, 42-43 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that a person who
watches a baseball game from an unscreened seat assumes the risk of being hit by a
baseball).
290. See supra Part H.A.
291. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 282, § 496C cmt. h. For an
application of this premise in the context of tire safety, see Wagner v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 890 F.2d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1989). See also Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d at
517-18 (declaring that "[i]f consumers know (or reasonably should know) the potential
ill health effects of eating at [McDonald's], they cannot blame [McDonald's] if they,
nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite with a surfeit of supersized [McDonald's]
products").
293. Mark Dolliver, Assigning Blame; At a Gut Level-Literally-We Prefer to
Take Responsibility for Our Fat(e), ADWEEK, June 9, 2003, at 45.
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explanatory.294 These findings are significant, for if a fast food patron is
held to have assumed the risk of consumption, she would then relieve
the fast food company of any common law duty to notify her of
nutritional information.
Along these lines, it appears unlikely that fast food companies
possess a common law duty to divulge the nutritional content of their
food simply "because of the inclusion of high levels of cholesterol, fat,
salt and sugar." 295  Polling data signals broad public awareness of the
tendency of fast food to contain such attributes,2 96 and Oliver v.
Heavenly Bagels, Inc. dictates that "[w]here ... a product by its very
nature has a dangerous attribute, liability is imposed only when the
product has an attribute not reasonably contemplated by the purchaser or
is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use."297 Notably, this very
conclusion was reached in Pelman: "[t]here is no allegation that
[McDonald's] of New York had in its possession any particular
knowledge that consumers did not have that would require it to
promulgate information about the nutritional contents of the
products."299  Moreover, most fast food companies offer some
nutritional information online, as well as in stores-if requested by a
patron.299
Then again, while fast food patrons may indeed recognize that
consumption of fast food can lead to obesity, they often fail to recognize
the extent to which such consumption may harm them, particularly since
they frequently underestimate the levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and
sugar in fast food,3 ° and often miscalculate or confuse the relative
nutritional content of fast food items.3°' Significantly, when determining
common law duties, courts routinely emphasize the concept of "extent
of knowledge." For instance, in Guevara v. Dorsey Laboratories, the
294. Id.
295. See Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
296. See supra Part I.D.
297. 729 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (App. Div. 2001). This principle is also evident in
state codes. For instance, section 2307.76(B) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that
"[a] product is not defective due to lack of warning or instruction or inadequate warning
or instruction as a result of the failure of its manufacturer to warn or instruct about an
open and obvious risk or a risk that is a matter of common knowledge." OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.76(B) (2001).
298. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. See supra Part I.D.
301. See supra Part UI.D (discussing unexpected content of such items as veggie
burgers); see also Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (chastising McDonald's by doubting
that a reasonable consumer would know that a Chicken McNugget-"seemingly a
healthier option than McDonald's hamburgers"--contains twice the fat of a McDonald's




U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that a common law
duty to warn arises whenever a product is "'dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it."' 3 2  This principle was also recently evident in
tobacco litigations. Most illustratively, consider Engle v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,33 where the plaintiffs acknowledged their long-term
awareness of risks associated with smoking, yet they successfully
demonstrated that cigarette manufacturers "knew of dangerous aspects
of their products beyond those commonly understood and therefore were
responsible for the smokers' continued addiction. "0
Therefore, it appears that fast food patrons tend to partially assume
the risk of fast food consumption: they understand that consumption of
fast food may hasten obesity, which, in turn, may precipitate the onset
of disease, yet they underestimate or discount this relationship because
of insufficient information. This is, of course, a parallel interpretation
to that employed by lung cancer victims who became ill after years of
smoking and years of certain subterfuge by the tobacco industry."5 As
will now be explored, for individuals who overconsume fast food,
inadequate recognition of risk would seem especially troubling.
b. Overconsumption: Intended Use, Foreseeable Misuse or Product
Misuse?
To introduce the next step in the analysis of a potential common
law duty to warn, consider that fast food companies, like all companies,
need only warn about risks associated with intended use or foreseeable
misuse of their products. 30 6 Thus, when a consumer uses a product in an
302. 845 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citing Jackson v.
Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 282, § 402A cmt. i)).
303. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (remanding to state court
following removal on July 24, 2000, which followed the July 14, 2000 jury verdict
awarding $145 billion punitive damages in state court).
304. Grief v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 114 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D. Conn. 2000)
(noting the plaintiff's success in Engle).
305. For an illuminating discussion on the partial assumption of risk in the
context of tobacco use, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1502-27
(1999).
306. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Deseret Med., Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 122-23 (Ist Cir.
1991) (holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded that a device manufacturer
knew a catheter was being used in open-heart surgery); Sutherland v. Elpower Corp.,
923 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a toy manufacturer could be held
liable for failure to warn about "reasonably foreseeable, albeit unintended, uses" of its
product); Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (defining
misuse as use of a product where it is handled "in a way which the manufacturer could
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unforeseeable manner, courts typically absolve manufacturers and sellers
of liability,307 and classify such consumer behavior as "product
misuse." 38 Accordingly, the foreseeability of a particular misuse often
determines the existence of a duty to warn.
Naturally, the primary, if only, intended use for fast food, like any
food, is its consumption. A more engaging analysis concerns whether
the overconsumption of fast food shall be considered an intended use,
foreseeable misuse or simply product misuse.
As highlighted by Pelman, fast food companies routinely extol the
virtues of regularly consuming fast food, thus perhaps positing
overconsumption as an "intended" use.3"9 As recently as 2002,
McDonald's chief nutritionist championed the possibility of eating
McDonald's "three times a day" and, likewise, a McDonald's
spokesman blithely declared, "[elating McDonald's food can easily fit
into a balanced diet. I eat its food every day, and I'm perfectly
healthy. 3 10 On the other hand, eating something "three times a day" or
"everyday" does not, per se, suggest "overconsumption"; indeed,
Americans are expected to eat three meals a day, everyday. Moreover,
rather than evincing instructions for use, statements encouraging regular
consumption of a particular product may better resemble "mere
puffery," or exaggerated declarations that make no specific claims on
which consumers can rely. The Pelman court considered it as such.3"
Consequently, it appears doubtful that overconsumption of fast food
shall best be considered an "intended" use.
not have reasonably foreseen or expected in the normal and intended use of such
[product]"); Johnson v. Husky Indus., 536 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding that a
manufacturer of charcoal briquettes could be held liable for inadequately warning against
indoor use for heating); Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 467 A.2d 615, 620 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1983) (reasoning that an electric lawn mower "might stall and that a user might
attempt to unclog the blade by placing some part of his body near the blade").
307. See Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1980); see
also Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 172-73 (Miss. 1974) (highlighting
consumer expectations in determination of reasonableness of danger). The dual
requirement that the plaintiff prove a product to be both defective and unreasonably
dangerous serves only to distinguish defective products from those foods or drugs which
necessarily involve some risk of harm, if only from overconsumption. See Knitz v.
Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 817 n.2, 818 (Ohio 1982); see also Cremeans v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 452 N.E.2d 1281, 1283-84 (Ohio 1983) (finding the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement may not apply where the plaintiff cannot prove that the product
is not as safe as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner).
308. Hughes, 288 N.W.2d at 545.
309. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
310. Am. Brief for Plaintiff at 33, Pelman 11, (No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS)).
311. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (finding that "[m]erely encouraging consumers to
eat its products 'everyday' is mere puffery, at most, in the absence of a claim that to do
so will result in a specific effect on health").
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Determining whether overconsumption of fast food shall be
considered foreseeable misuse or product misuse ostensibly proves more
challenging. At first glance, a consumer's decision to overconsume fast
food signals notions of common knowledge and assumption of risk-as
the inherent dangers of eating too much food are well known.31 2 Section
402A of the Restatement Second of Torts, in fact, endorses this
sentiment: "[i]f the injury results ... from abnormal consumption, as
where a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not
liable."313 "[A] seller is not required to warn with respect to products,
or ingredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so,
when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of time,
when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and
recognized. 314 Even more revealingly, section 402A cites as a relevant
example "foods containing such substances as saturated fats, which may
over a period of time have a deleterious effect upon the human heart. 315
Certainly, fast food readily illustrates a food "containing such
substances as saturated fats, which may over a period of time have a
deleterious effect upon the human heart."
316
Along these lines, it may prove illuminating to consider how courts
have treated the overconsumption of other food products, particularly if
duties have arisen from such overconsumption. Consider, for instance,
whether the overconsumption of alcohol shall constitute foreseeable
misuse or product misuse. This very question became a common one in
courts during the late 1980s, prior to federally mandated alcohol
warning requirements," 7  as well as the imposition of NLEA
requirements on nonrestaurant food and beverages. 18  Revealingly,
courts consistently declined to impose a duty upon distillers to warn of
overconsumption, reasoning primarily that individuals bear the duty to
moderate their own intake. To illustrate, observe Brown Forman Corp.
v. Brune, where a Texas court held:
312. See supra Part I.A.
313. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 282, § 402A cmt. h.
314. Id. § 402A cmt. j.
315. Id.; see also Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (affirming the concept
underlying section 402A, the court noted, "[pllaintiffs cite no case law to support the
contention that overconsumption of a food product may be considered a misuse").
316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 282, § 402A cmt. j.
317. See 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) ("(1) According to the surgeon general, women
should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth
defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or
operate machinery, and may cause health problems."); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v.
McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991) (holding that an alcohol manufacturer has
no duty to warn of danger of becoming an alcoholic from excessive consumption of
alcoholic beverages).
318. See supra Part II.A.
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[T]he alcoholic beverage drinker maintains the ultimate power
and thus the obligation to control his own drinking
behavior. ... [T]here will always be individuals who, though
informed about the dangers associated with the use of alcoholic
beverages, choose to misuse the product .... [W]e conclude
that no legal duty existed on the part of Braun-Forman to place
a warning on its containers of tequila that overconsumption of
tequila within a short period of time may cause death.3 19
Similarly, courts expected "ordinary everyday consumers" to know
better than to overconsume alcohol. Specifically, courts have regularly
held that "the ordinary everyday consumer surely understands that
overconsumption of beer may have harmful, and even disastrous
effects .... Furthermore, the intended use of beer is for consumption by
adults in moderate amounts.
320
Upon reviewing the legal framework of duties arising from the
overconsumption of alcohol, several intriguing questions emerge. For
one, do the consumption choices of fast food patrons resemble those of
beer or liquor drinkers, in that society should presume they recognize
the consequences of overconsumption? In other words, should fast food
patrons "know their own limits"? Also, would holding fast food
restaurants liable for the overconsumption of certain patrons trigger an
unintentional, and likely undesirable consequence: employees of fast
food restaurants bearing the responsibility to somehow monitor the
eating patterns of their patrons, like bartenders or waiters?32" '
319. 893 S.W.2d 640, 645-47 (Tex. App. 1994); see also Malek v. Miller
Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.. 1988) (finding that an alcohol
manufacturer had no legal duty to warn of the consequences arising from excessive
consumption of alcohol).
320. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 516 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting
Rohe v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., No. C-2-82-161, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 15,
1983)); see also Desatnik v. Lem Motlow, Prop., No. 84 C.A. 104, 1986 WL 760, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Ian, 9, 1986) (finding that death caused by an overdose of alcohol not
grounds for imposing liability on manufacturer); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits
Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1984) (declining to find liability for death caused by
single overdose of grain alcohol); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583
(Tex. App. 1987) (holding that "[tihe ordinary consumer in today's society, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the characteristics of the product,
knows of the dangers of driving while intoxicated").
321. Representative Keller suggests this very point:
Essentially [a successful class action obesity suit] would convert the 18-year-
old kids who work in places like McDonald's into bartenders who would
have to look at someone like me and say, "Sorry congressman, I'm going to




Alternatively, since only restaurant food was exempted from nutritional
labeling requirements, has Congress purposefully determined that
restaurant-goers, which by definition include fast food patrons, harbor
greater awareness for the consequences of overconsumption than do
consumers of groceries or alcohol?3 22
On the other hand, consider the following nuance: if fast food
restaurants recognize that certain patrons, whether for biological or
social reasons, are uniquely predisposed to consuming large portions,
could they then bear a common law duty to warn? Although most state
courts have refrained from identifying such a duty for risks that affect
few individuals,323 a few have held otherwise in cases where
hypersensitive individuals could suffer serious injury.3 4 For instance, in
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a drug company bore a duty to warn of the less
than one-in-one-million risk of contracting polio from its vaccine. 32
Interestingly, despite the seeming ubiquity of fast food restaurants,
those who frequent them appear to be a remarkably discernable group of
individuals. In fact, McDonald's internal surveys find that "72% of its
customers are 'Heavy Users,' meaning they visit McDonald's at least
once a week," and of that group, "22% are 'Super Heavy
Users,' . . . meaning they eat 'at McDonald's ten times or more a
month."' 326  In stark contrast, then, only the remaining 28% of
McDonald's customers visit the chain less than once per week, thus
illustrating that those who eat at McDonald's are usually regular,
perhaps long-time customers, rather than infrequent visitors. Indeed,
though no scientific link may exist between fast food consumption and
Mike Schneider, Bill Would Outlaw Blaming Restaurants for Obesity, AP, Jan. 27,
2003, available at http://www.defeatdiabetes.org/ArticleslawO30127. him.
322. A thorough review by the author of the congressional testimony associated
with the NLEA did not indicate such a purpose.
323. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to
Know" from the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON
REG. 293, 346 (1994) (noting "[mianufacturers generally do not have a duty to warn of
risks that may affect only very few individuals").
324. Id.; see, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir.
1969) (finding that a drug manufacturer may have the duty to warn "'those few persons
whom it knows cannot apply its product without serious injury'"); Wright v. Carter
Prods., 244 F.2d 53, 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that a manufacturer of deodorant
that caused skin rash in a tiny percentage of its users may have the duty to warn).
325. 399 F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968) (determining that "[w]hen, in a
particular case, the risk qualitatively (for example, of death or major disability) as well
as quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a
true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given").
326. Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *1 (citing trial testimony of McDonald's
U.S. Vice President of Marketing David Green).
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addiction,'T the conspicuous frequency at which certain individuals
consume fast food may suggest an unyielding affinity or perhaps even
dependency.
In light of such consumption trends, would Davis suggest that fast
food companies bear a duty to warn? Significantly, consider that Davis
only identified a duty because, absent using the vaccine, the risk of
contracting polio was equally small.328 In contrast, upon applying that
principle to fast food consumption, it appears possible, if not probable,
that one who frequently consumes fast food would become obese
through other means (for example, increased home cooking), absent the
opportunity to further consume fast food. Indeed, would not
overconsumption of all foods result in risk to one's health? Moreover,
even assuming arguendo that fast food contains some "addictive" quality
that compels certain predisposed patrons to overconsumption (that is,
similar to an allergic reaction), that alone would not entail a duty. As a
matter of fact, courts have held that those with common food allergies,
such as to peanuts or to strawberries, will be aware of them in restaurant
dishes, and thus not be entitled to warning.329
On balance, it appears that the overconsumption of fast food better
resembles product misuse than foreseeable misuse, thus diminishing the
need for a duty to warn. This seems most clear when contrasting the
overconsumption of fast food with that of alcohol, which has been
identified as an informed consumer risk, as well as when recognizing
such overconsumption as a potential, but not exclusive means by which
one may become obese. Nevertheless, unlike overconsumers of alcohol,
those who overconsume fast food may not fully recognize the extent of
risk without actual knowledge of nutritional content. This would seem
especially true with regard to children.
c. Duty to Warn Children Customers?
Even if fast food companies bear no common law duty to reveal the
content of their food to adult patrons, they may still have a duty to their
children patrons, who are their foremost advertising target. As
discussed in Part I, children lack the cognitive and reasoning skills of
adults, thus making their food selections less reasoned, and perhaps
327. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
328. See 399 F.2d at 129-30.
329. See, e.g., Thompson v. Eastern Pac. Enters., No. 49924-6-1, 2003 WL
352914, at *1, *6 (Wash. Ct, App. Feb. 18, 2003) (holding that a customer who had a
severe allergic reaction after eating almond chicken ordered from defendant's restaurant
failed to establish a duty on the part of the restaurant to warn of possible inclusion or
cross contamination of peanut or peanut products).
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more deserving of explicit information. 330  Equally significant, courts
have more willingly imposed common law duties upon those industries
that pursue children customers, particularly since children are often
unable to discriminate between news and commercials, as well as
educative and persuasive intent. 33 ' Therefore, assessing the fast food
industry's particular interest in children may illuminate any intrinsic
value in imposing an age-specific duty to warn.
As a starting point, consider the child-centered marketing strategies
employed by the fast food industry. These strategies typically call for
children to observe recurrent images, including representations on
television, product placements in children's movies, billboards on school
buses, and offers to obtain popular toys upon purchasing meals. 32
Along these lines, such strategies tend to promote inexhaustible
consumption, as well as insinuate that children who consume fast food
tend to be attractive, popular, and athletic.333
Perhaps revealingly, the style and substance of these child-centered
marketing strategies resemble those employed by the tobacco industry
and, more importantly, those which have triggered a duty to warn for
tobacco companies.334 Indeed, the similarity of such strategies may be
330. See supra Part I.E.
331. See id.
332. See id. Even public elementary school teachers have resorted to passing
out fast food toys. See Sue Weibezahl Naylor, Students' Growth Isn't Always for the
Best, SYRACUSE HERALD-J., Dec. 30, 1991, at B3 (citing a survey conducted by Wendy
Wolfe of Cornell University which found that teachers often reward students with candy
or snacks associated with fast food promotions).
333. For instance, examine how Burger King promotes its "Big Kids Meal," a
meal which contains approximately 700 to 1,000 calories or more than two-thirds of the
recommended daily caloric intake for children: it is advertised with pictures of fit-
looking children, while depicting the rhetorical question and answer, "'Do you want to
be a Big Kid? You Should."' See Goodman, supra note 96, at A19. For the complete
nutritional information of the Burger King Big Kids Meal, see Burger King Corp., Big
Kids Meal, at http://www.bk.com/food/products/bigkids-meal.aspx (last visited Nov.
17, 2004); Burger King Corp., Nutritional Facts, at
http://www.bk.com/Food/Nutrition/NutritionWizard/index.aspx?bid=8 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004). Also note that while certain companies have begun to incorporate
ostensibly "prochildren's health" initiatives, such as Burger King's sponsorship of the
"Presidential Active Lifestyle and Physical Fitness Award" for athletic children, their
message appears muted, if not contradicted, by their intense marketing. On Burger
King's website, for instance, a text hyperlink to information on the fitness award appears
above a pictured hyperlink of a "Double Cheeseburger Combo" meal, an item
containing approximately 1200 calories. See Burger King Corp., Burger King Big Kids
Club, at http://burgerking.comBigKids/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); Burger
King Corp., Nutritional Facts, at
http://www.bk.com/Food/Nutrition/NutritionWizard/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 17,
2004).
334. See Goodman, supra note 96, at A19; Richard Daynard, head of
Northeastern University's Tobacco Products Liability Project, has stated: "food
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illustrated by United States v. Philip Morris Inc., where the court
described the promotional techniques routinely adopted by the tobacco
industry:
[d]efendants have advertised in stores near high schools,
promoted brands heavily during spring and summer breaks,
given away cigarettes at places where young persons
congregate, paid for product placement in movies with youth
audiences, placed advertisements in magazines with high youth
readership, and sponsored sporting events, rock concerts, and
other events of interest to children.33
In fact, in some respects, the child-centered strategies advanced by
the fast food industry have proven more absorbing than those utilized by
tobacco companies. To illustrate, consider that while 96% of children
recognize "Ronald McDonald" as a symbol of fast food, only 72%
recognize "Joe Camel" as a symbol of cigarettes."' Consequently,
imposing a similar common law duty upon fast food restaurants may
prove likewise desirable, particularly considering the inability of
children to distinguish promotion from information, as well as the
tendency of humans to develop lifelong eating habits as children and the
surging social cost of obesity.337
The utility of imposing such a duty, however, must also account for
intervening and perhaps more explanatory considerations, namely the
role played by parents in determining their children's food choices, as
well as other lifestyle influences that may contribute to childhood
obesity. Along these lines, consider that 30% of American parents
report having overweight children, 38 and 48% believe their children
consume excessive amounts of fast food.339  Therefore, parents
companies have very sophisticated motivational people on their payroll to figure out how
to get kids to use their product." Id. For a methodical analysis of tobacco advertising,
see generally David A. Kessler et al., The Food and Drug Administration's Rule on
Tobacco: Blending Science and Law, 99 PEDIATRICS 884 (1997).
335. 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2000).
336. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 558.
337. See supra Part I.E.
338. See Bella English, The Big Battle: A Generation of Overweight Kids
Struggles to Reshape Eating and Exercise Habits, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2003, at
D1.
339. Marjorie Connelly, More Children Are Obese, and More Americans Know
It, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2003, at F5; see also Pediatric Obesity; Report Card May
Encourage Parents to Help Their Overweight Children Lose Weight, HEALTH & MED.
WK., Aug. 25, 2003, at 576 (concluding that "'[almong overweight children, the health
report card was associated with an increased parental awareness of their child's weight
status'"). However, parental awareness of their children's obesity often does not
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acknowledge significant awareness of, if not acquiescence to, their
children's weight and eating habits. This proves particularly meaningful
upon considering that parents often decide or greatly influence their
children's food choices and levels of consumption.2 °
Socioeconomic changes within the American family also appear
consequential. Perhaps most significantly, both parents are more likely
to work, and to work longer hours than in the past, thus diminishing the
percentage of parents who find time to prepare meals for their
families.3' Correspondingly, families are more inclined to purchase
preprepared meals from restaurants, including fast food restaurants,
which generally provide larger and less nutritious servings . 2 This is
perhaps most evident among families of modest wealth or those with
single parents, as they often regard fast food not only as a convenience,
but also as an economical substitute. u3 Similarly, consider that families
in lower-income neighborhoods frequently lack access to supermarkets,
thus increasing the appeal of fast food.' As a result, studies find that
children from economically disadvantaged or single-parent households
emerge until after age five, and studies have demonstrated correlation between parental
level of education and parental awareness of children's obesity. See Amy E. Baughcum
et al., Maternal Perceptions of Overweight Preschool Children, 106 PEDIATRICS 1380,
1384 (2000).
340. See supra Part I.E.
341. See U.S. CENSus BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WORK AND WORK-
RELATED ACTIVITIES OF MOTHERS RECEIVING TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY
FAMILIES: 1996, 1998, AND 2000, at 3 (2002) (noting that approximately 72% of mothers
work and the corresponding effects on behavior within the family), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-85.pdf.
342. See supra Part I.B.
343. See generally Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health,
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The New Morbidity Revisited: A Renewed Commitment to the
Psychosocial Aspects of Pediatric Care, 108 PEDIATRICS 1227, 1228 (noting the
.struggles of working parents" as a challenge to curbing obesity); see also Brad D.
Berman et al., After-School Child Care and Self-Esteem in School-Age Children, 89
PEDIATRICS 654, 655-59 (1992) (stating that lower-socioeconomic families often require
their children to care for themselves or their siblings after school, and a possible
consequence of afterschool self-care and sibling care is obesity); Heidi Evans, Surge in
Childhood Obesity Prompts Focus on Healthy Nutrition, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 2,
2003, at 13F ("[B]usy, working parents are not always present to supervise meals. Fast
food is a ubiquitous convenience.").
344. J. Michael McGinnis et al., The Case for More Active Policy Attention to
Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH AFF. 78, 86 (2002) (concluding that children overeat
"unhealthy foods because of the absence of supermarkets in low-income
neighborhoods"); Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-
Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 357-58 (2003) (noting a lower
percentage of grocery stores in urban areas as compared to suburban areas, as well as a
lack of readily available healthier foods such as fresh fruits and vegetables); Gerald
Hass, Fast Food, Fat Kids, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2002, at A19 (noting that
supermarkets are 30% less prevalent in lower-income neighborhoods).
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tend to skip breakfast, eat fewer vegetables, and eat more "junk food"
than any other demographic segment.3 5
Likewise revealing, children have become less physically active,
and thus expend fewer calories than children of previous generations.
Notably, this trend has been observed by parents, as 33% find their
children exercise less than they did at the same age." 6 Indeed, often at
the expense of outdoor activity, American children are spending an
increasing amount of time watching television, surfing the Internet, or
playing videogames." 7 These behavioral modifications appear even
more meaningful when coupled with the diminished availability of
physical education programs. 8
Therefore, the surge in childhood obesity may reflect
socioeconomic adaptations as much as, if not more than, subterfuge or
disingenuity on the part of the fast food industry. Moreover, parents
appear partly accountable, as they exhibit considerable awareness of
their children's eating habits and physical activities, a suggestive
corollary in light of their predilection to significantly influence the
choice of meals and levels of consumption among their children. On the
other hand, the child-centered marketing strategies of fast food
companies clearly resemble those employed, and later discredited by the
tobacco industry. More importantly, the strategies of these two
industries have each procured consequences that impair public health
and undermine efficient allocation of public expenditures. In light of
this ambivalent conclusion, perhaps it would be wise to contemplate the
construction of a duty to warn that could respond to such disparate
explanations.
d. Adequacy of Warnings
Beyond exploring a possible duty on the part of fast food companies
to warn consumers of their foods' nutritional content rests the
exploration of sufficient and optimal formats for any required warnings.
For instance, would such a warning need to replicate the familiar
"nutrition facts" format imposed by NLEA, or would current voluntary
methods (that is, over-the-counter requests or online access) be deemed
acceptable?
345. Naylor, supra note 332; see also David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins,
Racial Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health,
116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 404, 411 (2001) (finding that single-parent households are
associated with diminished control and supervision of children's behavior).
346. See Connelly, supra note 339.
347. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
2004:1161 1225
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Generally, warnings associated with food and drugs may be judged
inadequate if their tone, placement or typeface fails to generate the
consumer's notice; 9 if they are obscured by surrounding advertising
content;3" or if they fail to provide clear instructions for avoiding or
minimizing risk.35" ' As discussed in Part II, fast food restaurants have
begun to supply nutritional information on their websites or upon
request at the counter. Yet, in doing so, they utilize varied formats,
incomplete information, and promotional language.352 Likewise raising
doubts as to the sufficiency of existing informational channels,
nutritional data provided after the point of sale proves significantly less
informative than that offered before purchase.353 Moreover, up to 40%
of Americans remain without Internet access,3 4 thus suggesting that
online nutritional content fails to attract the attention of many customers.
Along these lines, by only inviting consumers to learn about their
products' nutritional content, whether by accessing a company website
or requesting information at the counter, fast food companies, at least
conceptually, risk conflict with recent case law that regards invitations
to learn of warnings as inferior to direct warnings. Consider, for
instance, how California courts have treated invitations to learn of
carcinogenic and toxic substances within consumer products. In
Ingredient Communication Council, Inc. v. Lungren, store signs, public
advertising, and an 800 number were deemed legally insufficient upon
comparison to the "clear and reasonable warning to consumers"
supplied by product labels. 55 Specifically, the mere opportunity to be
349. See, e.g., Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981)
("A warning may be found to be unreasonable in that it was unduly delayed, reluctant in
tone or lacking in a sense of urgency."); Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453,
465-67 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that a manufacturer of an oral polio vaccine failed to
provide the requisite tone for the danger of side effects of the vaccine). See generally
Noah, supra note 323, at 347 (offering a probative discussion of warnings).
350. See, e.g., Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that advertising for products which require warnings must present those
warnings clearly); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)
(finding that, in advertising for widespread distribution of polio vaccine, the warning in
the advertising must reach the potential users directly).
351. See, e.g., Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980) (stating the need for manufacturers to provide clear instructions in order to avoid
risks inherent in food and drugs); Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., 695 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266
(Sup. Ct. 1999) (concluding that the failure to include available information about
avoiding the risk of contacting polio raised an issue of fact as to whether the drug
manufacturer provided reasonable instructions).
352. See supra Part ff.B.
353. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining findings of the
FTC).
354. Id.
355. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 223 (Ct. App. 1992).
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warned was thought to require excessive effort of the consumer, and
since most consumers would not expend such "considerable effort," the
actual warning would ultimately protect too few consumers."'
Certainly, while carcinogenic and toxic substances are qualitatively
different and more harmful than any known contents of fast food,
applying the principle of Ingredient Communication Council to fast food
labeling proves intriguing nevertheless. To the extent fast food
companies disclose nutritional content, they typically invite customers to
request nutritional information, either at the counter or on the Internet,
rather than provide direct, and automatically observed labeling on
cartons or menus. Considering that a normal fast food patron has
chosen to eat at such a restaurant in part because of the speed at which
he will obtain his meal,357 having to engage in a separate request may be
deemed "considerable effort." By deduction, then, such "invitations" to
nutritional disclosure likely inform few patrons.
It stands to reason, therefore, that should fast food companies bear
a common law duty to warn of their foods' nutritional content, their
current methods of disclosure would likely be judged inadequate. Not
only are they varied, incomplete, and often surrounded by advertising
content, they also represent mere invitations to be warned, which likely
yield minimal transmission of information.
2. LINKING FAST FOOD WITH OBESITY AND DISEASE: A CHALLENGE IN
CAUSATION
Upon determination of any common law duty to warn of fast foods'
nutritional content, the causal linkage between failing to satisfy that duty
and the resulting health ailments of certain patrons would then require
examination. Two types of causal linkages are contextually most
plausible, although both appear attenuated nevertheless. The first would
356. Id. at 224-25. The California Court of Appeals held:
Any meaningful definition of "availability" prior to exposure must similarly
consider the probability of the prospective consumer seeing or hearing the
warning message. Availability of the warning message ... must mean more
than the possibility a consumer would be apprised of the specific warning
message only through considerable effort. An invitation to inquire about
possible warnings on products is not equivalent to providing the consumer a
warning about a specific product.
Id.
357. See Cheryl Rosen, McDonald's Serves Up Faster Payment System,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 15, 2001, at 81 (noting discernable fast food customer interest
in obtaining food quickly), available at http://www.informationweek.com. This desire
is also observable through customer interest in purchasing items at the drive through
windows, rather than in the store. See Fran Hawthorne, Drive Right Up and Don't Get
Out, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2003, at G2.
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originate upon a fast food company deceptively advertising products,
followed by a consumer observing such advertising and then
overconsuming those products, the consumer then becoming obese
because of such overconsumption, and, lastly, the consumer suffering
illness triggered by the onset of obesity. Alternatively, the causal
linkage may start at the processing plant, where allegedly addictive
ingredients are coupled with deceptive content to promote
overconsumption, which, in turn, causes certain patrons to become
obese, and then acquire ailments resulting from their obesity.
The two linkages essentially combine the two forms of causation
required under most state laws: cause-in-fact and proximate cause. That
is, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the fast food company's
conduct (that is, deceptive advertising or addictive or harmful
ingredients) is the ultimate cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries-
obesity-related health ailments-where the injuries would not have
occurred but for that conduct.358 Establishing cause-in-fact can prove
ambitious. For instance, while it may be predicated upon circumstantial
evidence, such evidence must not be speculative.359 Along these lines,
"the mere possibility" that certain conduct may have been the cause of a
particular harm shall not be considered a sufficient link between the
two. 360
Unlike lung cancer and smoking, or breast cancer and silicone
breast implants, obesity and fast food consumption are not a necessary
pair. Indeed, obesity can be triggered by a number of considerations,
including lack of exercise, genetic predisposition, or overconsumption of
various foods.36' Moreover, fast food, unlike cigarettes, is not, by any
scientific measure, "addictive," 362 and irrespective of any deceptive
advertising, consumers may gravitate toward fast food simply because of
taste. Market studies, in fact, suggest that fast food patrons make their
358. See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis Univ., 336 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir.
2003) (evaluating Missouri law that requires the plaintiff to show that his injuries
"would not have occurred but for that conduct"); see also Selph v. Evanoff, 184
N.W.2d 282, 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that proximate cause is that which
"produces injury and without which such injury would not have occurred"). For a
thorough discussion of causation, see ABRAHAM, supra note 283, at 99-136.
359. See, e.g., Donley v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 106 P.2d 652, 655 (Kan.
1940) (finding that circumstantial evidence must indicate a reasonable inference of
causation); Skinner v. Square D. Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 1994) (stating "a
plaintiffs circumstantial proof must facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not
mere speculation").
360. Irwin v. Odyssey Contracting Corp., 61 Fed. Appx. 150, 153-54 (6th Cir.
2003); Jordan v. Whiting Corp., 240 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Mich. 1976).
361. See supra Part I.C.
362. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
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selections primarily on the basis of perceived taste, rather than on price
or health implications.
363
Along with the arduous task of establishing cause-in-fact, a plaintiff
in an obesity-related suit must also substantiate the existence of
proximate cause, meaning the resulting injury of obesity must not be
"too attenuated" from any initial conduct by a fast food company. 364
That is, if a fast food company could not reasonably foresee that its
allegedly deceptive advertising or its addictive ingredients would cause a
group of individuals to overconsume fast food, which, in turn, would
cause them to become obese, and their obesity would then cause them to
acquire obesity-related diseases, then the causal linkage would break.365
In addition, since multiple causes of obesity exist, the conduct of a
fast food company must be shown as "substantial" in order to satisfy the
contours of proximate cause.366 Several factors are often considered
when assessing whether a particular cause shall be considered
"substantial," including whether the event would have occurred without
the cause,367 as well as the proportional harm triggered by each cause.368
In contrast to the direct and often exclusive link between smoking and
lung cancer, overconsumption of fast food likely serves as a
contributing, though not necessarily "substantial" cause of obesity.
Indeed, given the probable existence of multiple explanations (for
example, consumption of non-fast food, exercise regimen, metabolic
absorption rate, cellular structure, and physiological factors),
determining whether the overconsumption of fast food shall be
considered "substantial" requires assessment of whether such obesity
would have arisen regardless, as well as a survey of the proportional
363. See supra Part I.D.
364. See St. Louis Univ., 336 F.3d at 302.
365. See id. ("The requirement of proving proximate cause absolves those actors
whom it would be unfair to punish because of the attenuated relation which their conduct
bears to the plaintiff's injury ... [which] must be a reasonable and probable
consequence of the act or omission of the defendant."). Moreover, proximate cause is
deemed to be "a limitation the law imposes upon the right to recover for the
consequences of a negligent act." Id.; see also Dedes v. Asch, 590 N.W.2d 605, 609
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (noting how proximate cause serves to limit legal responsibility).
366. See Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 166 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
367. See id. For a discussion on how courts address whether an event would
have occurred without the cause, see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 240 (4th ed. 1971).
368. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 301 n.37 (5th Cir. 2001)
(stating that liability in a torts lawsuit depends upon each party's contribution to the
harm); Transam. Ins. Fin. Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 89 Civ. 8625 (PNL),
1992 WL 350800, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1992) (stating that the "test to determine
whether a defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial factor" requires an analysis of
each actor's contributions toward the harm).
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harm assessable to each cause.369 Granted, this type of analysis would
vary by individual patron, but in representing the only known standard
to date, Pelman opines that one must frequent a fast food restaurant
"more than once per week" for that restaurant's products to be
considered a substantial cause Y°  Perhaps revealingly, 72% of
McDonald's patrons visit one of their franchises at least once a week, 37'
meaning that a sizable number of obese fast food patrons could
theoretically satisfy the Pelman standard, provided other variables do
not interfere.
On the other hand, merely concluding that fast food
overconsumption may, in certain instances, comprise a substantial cause
of obesity does not then automatically link together a legally cognizable
claim. The next, and similarly challenging, step would be determining
whether obesity triggered the incidence of disease or whether other
factors (for example, genetic predisposition or environmental
circumstances) precipitated such illness. For some diseases, such as
Type 2 diabetes, correlating obesity proves relatively easy. For others,
such as hypertension or heart disease, the link proves more onerous.
372
Clearly, a muddled, though theoretically plausible causal chain
exists between the overconsumption of fast food, obesity, and the
incidence of disease. At best, therefore, the requisite forseeability of
fast food companies to warn of their foods' content appears uncertain.
Only making the viability of an obesity-related claim against the fast
food industry more conjectural are economic considerations that
diminish the expected return of potential damages. Those considerations
will be explored in the following Subsection, as they may supply
systemic deterrents to the very root of obesity-related claims.
3. ECONOMIC DAMAGES OF A LESSER KIND: A BURGEONING SCHEME
OF DISINCENTIVES
Beyond the conceptual challenges of proving legal duty and
causation, obesity-related claims may encounter a diminishingly
remunerative landscape for tort and class actions, thus making them
369. See Cox, 256 F.3d at 301 n.37. This mode of analysis was discussed in
Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. at 539 (noting that "in order to allege that [McDonald's]
products were a significant factor in the plaintiffs' obesity and health problems, the
Complaint must address these other variables and, if possible, eliminate them").
370. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
371. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
372. See generally Ross C. Brownson & Frank S. Bright, Chronic Disease
Control in Public Heath Practice: Looking Back and Moving Forward, 119 PuB.
HEALTH REP. 230, 233 (2004) (explaining how hypertension and other diseases are
sometimes associated with the incidence of obesity).
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potentially poor vehicles for financial recompense. Most notably, the
108th Congress shall soon deliberate the Class Action Fairness Act of
2004 ("Fairness Act"),373 legislation that would substantially curtail jury
awards in class actions.374 One provision of the Fairness Act bears
particular mention, as it would transfer all class actions worth in excess
of $5 million to the federal courts, which typically provide substantially
smaller jury awards.375 Consequently, passage of the Fairness Act
376would truncate the expected rate of return of most class actions,
thereby modifying the risk or reward ratio for claimants and their
attorneys, and, in the aggregate, making such lawsuits less likely to
arise.
Similarly meaningful, the U.S. Supreme Court has actively sought
to decrease the expected value of class actions. Specifically, in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court, by a
six to three vote, ruled that punitive damages must proportion actual
harm suffered, and that disproportionate punitive damages would violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.377 Purely from the standpoint of economic expectations,
State Farm, like the Fairness Act, depreciates the expected value of a
class action suit, thus discouraging parties from expending the
significant costs often required to create a viable class.378 Moreover,
373. S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004).
374. See id. § 4. Specifically, the Fairness Act would make class actions filed
in state courts removable by any defendant if (1) the aggregate damages sought exceed
$5 million, and (2) one or more parties are from different states (unless more than two-
thirds of the class are from a single state). Id.
375. Id. For a discussion of the tendency of federal courts to provide
substantially smaller jury awards, see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:
Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 995 (2003).
376. Assuming passage of the Fairness Act, most class actions would be subject
to removal to federal court, since most involve one or more parties from different states.
See Senate Proceeds with Class Action Bill, 7 CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP. 14 (2004).
377. 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (overturning a $145 million award against State
Farm for mishandling an insurance claim). Note also that appellate courts have recently
become willing to reduce jury awards in class action suits. See, e.g., In re Exxon
Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). See generally Semra Mesulam,
Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma
with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1114 (2004) (arguing in favor of reduced jury awards).
For instance, in May 2003, a Florida appellate court overturned a $145 billion claim
against five tobacco firms. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
378. For a discussion on the extensive costs of forming a class, see Michael A.
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of
Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273 (1998). As a separate cost, also consider the collective
action problem often identified in forming a class. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2208
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and largely due to the amorphous, and likely immeasurable "harm"
suffered by fast food patrons, this disincentive would appear particularly
considerable when persuading a class of individuals to sue the fast food
industry. That is, how would a court sufficiently "punish" and "deter"
the fast food industry, when such damages must "proportionate" a
potentially unobservable, amount of harm, or risk violating due
process? 379 Suggestively, then, these disincentives and unpredictabilities
make the very emergence of such a class less probable.
A final systemic deterrence also bears mention: consider that
plaintiffs' attorneys in class actions typically receive 30% to 50% of
class action settlements and judgments.380 Similarly, only 20% of civil
liability awards represent genuine recompense 381 and since the cost of
litigation tends to increase over time, such a share of recompense should
accordingly decline. In other words, by their very nature, class actions
may constitute inefficient methods to remedy any harm suffered by fast
food patrons, as such patrons would receive only a fraction of the
proscribed restitution.382
Therefore, aside from the ambitious task of establishing both the
existence of a legal duty on the part of fast food companies to warn of
their foods' contents, as well as causation resulting from failing to
satisfy such a duty, prospective plaintiffs in obesity-related class actions
are likewise deterred by systemic changes in the American tort system
which have diminished the prospective value of class actions. Indeed,
the inherent calculation of costs and benefits associated with such
litigation has evolved into one of greater cost and lesser benefit, thus
diminishing the very incentive to commence suit.
n.92 (2000).
379. Per the decision set forth by Justice Kennedy in Campbell, the
'punishment" element of punitive damages, if applied to fast food companies, must be
"both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the [fast food patron]."
538 U.S. at 426.
380. See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 88-89 (2003).
381. See The Lawsuits of Madison County, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2003,
available at http://www.economist.com.
382. This seems especially true when considering the likely resources that would
be expended by the fast food industry-a $110-billion-a-year industry-in challenging
prospective judicially imposed changes to its business model. Keep in mind: many of
these restaurants appear rather sensitive when encountering even light-hearted critique of
their product. For a colorful example, note how McDonald's recently flexed its muscle
by suing Edoardo Raspelli, an Italian food critic, for defamation in Italy, after he told an
Italian newspaper, "'Gastronomically speaking, I find [McDonald's] meals repellent.
Those rinky-dink, wilting hamburgers; those obscene French fries that taste like
cardboard ... but that's enough. I feel sick just talking about it.'" Ken Dilanian,




On the other hand, should such lawsuits prove impossible or
impracticable, then fast food patrons will continue to consistently
underestimate the contents of fast food, and the likelihood that fast food
serves as a significant contributor to obesity and obesity-related diseases
will remain ignored. This is troubling not only for the health of those
patrons, but also for society at large, given the rising cost of obesity for
taxpayers and businesses alike. As a result, remedying and preventing
any harm caused by inadequate or nonexistent warnings related to fast
food consumption invites discussion of perhaps more corrective
methods. As will be explored in the next Part, the uncertain duty to
warn under state law may be displaced by explicit state and federal
regulatory requirements, thus heightening predictability of legal norms
and enhancing the efficiency of public expenditures.
V. PROPOSING A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO DETER
OVERCONSUMPTION
In 2003, approximately 180 bills or resolutions mentioning the
word "obesity" were introduced in state legislatures, an increase of over
150% from 2002.383 Although many of these bills, such as a tax on
movie tickets, would only tangentially impact the link between fast food
and obesity, they nevertheless suggest an increasing societal awareness
of the obesity epidemic.3" Moreover, a small fraction of these bills
reflect a targeted concern for the absence of notification of fast food's
nutritional contents. This is especially evident in perhaps the most
foreseeable state legislative reform to address the link between fast food
consumption and obesity: extending the provisions of NLEA to
restaurants, so that a statutory duty to warn is required of them and
requiring the warning to be evident at the point of sale.
Legislators from New York and Maine have introduced legislation
that would largely accomplish the extension of NLEA. In New York,
the Act to Amend Public Health Law, in Relation to the Posting of
Caloric Value, Carbohydrate, Fat and Sodium Content of Food Items
would compel all restaurant chains to list caloric, sodium, carbohydrate,
and fat levels on a standard, printed menu; for establishments with only
383. See Susan Lindt, Too Many Kids Getting Too Big for Their Health,
LANCASTER INTELLIGENCER J., Aug. 5, 2003, at Al (noting also that seventy-two such
bills were introduced in 2002).
384. Id. Kelly Brownell, director of the Yale Center for Eating and Weight
Disorders, stated: "Many of these bills are as important for what they represent as what
they can actually accomplish. The fact these are even part of the public discourse is a




menu boards, only calorie information would be required.385 Likewise,
in Maine, the Act to Provide Consumers at Chain Restaurants with
Accurate, Accessible Nutrition Information would require that restaurant
menus supply nutritional information in a format "similar to the
categories of nutrition information provided on packaged foods sold in
grocery stores"; restaurants without menus would instead have to hang
menu boards containing caloric levels of each item.386
These two state legislative efforts offer some conceptual promise." 7
Most importantly, they would equalize nutritional notification laws
among all food distributors and vendors, so that the same duties and
burdens placed on the grocery and food packaging industries would be
placed on the restaurant industry. Likewise significant, they would
enable consumers to anticipate notification in a uniform format, and at
the point-of-sale, rather than encountering haphazard notification at less
meaningful points in time. Considering that most Americans routinely
underestimate the potentially harmful contents of fast food, consumer
choice would thus likely be enhanced.
Primarily for reasons discussed earlier,3 8 however, the restaurant
lobby has successfully opposed these bills, and only one remains
viable. 38 9 Nevertheless, since these bills raise the specter of nutritional
notification, they invite the theory of consumer choice to help construct
a new theoretical framework under which optimal models to curb
obesity may arise.
385. Assemb. B. 5520, 226th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us.
386. L.D. 391, 121st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2003), available at
http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/search. asp.
387. The proposed California Uniform Retail Food Facilities Act would
essentially require the same from restaurants in California as would the New York and
Maine bills, but it would offer an alternative, and less invasive choice, whereby
restaurants would be required only to disclose nutrition data on demand and display
signs saying that such information were available. See S.B. 679, 1st Sess. (Cal. 2003),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/. Thus, it would essentially only
make law the current practice of most fast food restaurants. More generally, the
promise offered by these proposals reflects greater social and academic awareness of the
need to address obesity. See e.g., Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, & David Yosifon,
Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2004)
(exploring the link between behavioral economics and obesity).
388. See supra Part II.B.
389. Specifically, New York's Act to Amend the Public Health Law, in Relation
to the Posting of Caloric Value, Carbohydrate, Fat and Sodium Content of Food Items
remains before the Committee on Codes. See N.Y. Assemb. B. 5520. Maine's Act to
Provide Consumers at Chain Restaurants with Accurate, Accessible Nutrition
Information died in the Senate. See L.D. 391. California's Uniform Retail Food
Facilities Act was rejected in subcommittee. See Ca. S.B. 679. For a discussion of the
political challenges to these types of reforms, see Pressler, supra note 168, at El.
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As canvassed in Part I, individual food choices vary widely, from
the "fast food junkie" to the "fitness freak" and the theory of consumer
choice may help predict how individuals along that spectrum arrive at
their food selections, and thus whether increased awareness of nutrition
would appreciably impact one's food choice. Abstractly, the theory of
consumer choice finds that individuals determine the relative utility of
one choice over another, balanced against abilities and budgetary
constraints, which attach a relative cost to each prospective choice. For
most consumers, food "utility" may be measured by some combination
of taste and nutrition, while "abilities" refer to accessibility to those
food items, and "budgetary constraints" simply refer to how much
money the consumer can and is willing to spend on food. Each time
someone decides to eat, these variables intersect to procure a food
choice.
Applying the theory of consumer choice to fast food consumption
proves quite intriguing in light of this Article's findings. Specifically,
since fast food patrons tend to value taste more so than any other food
characteristic, it follows that the typical fast food patron ascribes a
higher food "utility" to taste than to nutrition, and it is likewise
plausible that this patron is unable or unwilling to spend significant
resources on food. This seems especially plausible upon considering
that the commercial failure of "light" menu items has been attributed to
fast food patrons' tendency to "talk about nutrition" but then "buy on
taste.''390 Moreover, since fast food patrons tend to be regular
customers rather than infrequent visitors, it is likewise plausible that
they are unable or unwilling to expend significant resources on food. In
stark contrast, a health-conscious person tends to place a higher value on
nutrition than taste, and since healthy food tends to be more expensive
than fast food, that person likely can and will spend more money on
food. Therefore, at least superficially, labeling for fast food items
appears unnecessary: the typical fast food patron already knows that
such food contains relatively innutritious content. Paradoxically, a more
health-oriented consumer would not eat fast food because her consumer
choice variables would not yield a decision to eat such food.
Although this paradigm seems appealing, it is based on faulty
premises. Namely, though fast food patrons likely place less
significance in nutritional data than do more health-conscious persons,
their reasoning is partly based on certain general assumptions about fast
food and its nutritional characteristics that, in the aggregate,
underestimate the extent to which that food is fattening and high in
calories.39' To illustrate, if the typical fast food patron assumes that a




"Double Whopper with Cheese" contains about 600 calories, would he
still select that item if he knew that it actually contains almost 1100
calories? Considering that the average person underestimates fast food's
caloric content by 56%, this assumption proves relevant to everyday
food choices. 3"
Along these lines, it stands to reason that most, if not all, fast food
patrons ascribe greater than "zero" significance to nutrition; relatively
speaking, they may not care deeply about nutrition, but to assume they
are indifferent seems exceedingly unlikely, if not implausible.3 93 Thus,
the food consumption preferences of many fast food patrons are derived
in part from inaccurate information. Suggestively, the ordering of such
preferences could change with proper nutritional notification, thus
yielding different food consumption choices. In practice, would
enhanced nutritional labeling dictate that a fast food patron would never
again eat fast food? No, but perhaps instead of frequenting fast food
restaurants four times a week, he would do so only twice; or perhaps
instead of selecting a "Double Whopper with Cheese," he would choose
a "Single Whopper without Cheese." Over time, and in the aggregate,
moderated consumption of fast food would likely diminish national rates
of obesity, thus reducing the cost of obesity on taxpayers and businesses
alike. On the other hand, since fast food patrons most significantly
value taste, predicting such effect on consumption proves conjectural.
Accordingly, exploring potential models by which the law might
facilitate the transmission of nutritional information to fast food patrons
may help identify the paradigmatic method, thereby enhancing consumer
choice and optimizing social and economic policy.
A. Model I: Duty of Absolute Notification
Perhaps the simplest approach to compel nutritional disclosure from
fast food restaurants would be to amend NLEA and remove the labeling
exemption for all restaurants. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 343 could be
modified by eliminating subsection (q)(5)(A)(i), which currently states,
"subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) shall not apply to food-(i) which
is served in restaurants or other establishments in which food is served
for immediate human consumption or which is sold for sale or use in
392. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
393. Indeed, if fast food patrons were indifferent about nutrition, most studies
would indicate nominal concern about nutrition. See supra Part I.D. More
speculatively, one may ponder why fast food companies only televise commercials with
fit-looking employees and customers, especially when those customers are children, if




such establishments." 3" Borrowing from the Maine and New York
legislative proposals, subsequent regulations could then ensure that such
notification arises at the point-of-sale. Model I would be the plainest
way to confirm that fast food patrons receive the same nutritional
knowledge ascribed by NLEA that is afforded to consumers in grocery
stores and other retail outlets.
The type of simple solution offered by Model I, however, contains
several conceptual drawbacks. First, by affecting all restaurants, Model
I procures consequences beyond its intended purpose-that is, for fast
food restaurants to notify consumers of their foods' content. Along
these lines, small diners and other nonchain restaurants, which often
vary cooking styles depending upon season or the whims of individual
chefs, may experience an undue burden in trying to assess the nutritional
content of their dishes. Indeed, unlike fast food restaurants, most
restaurant types are not renowned for their consistency of operation.
Also, considering that most adult fast food patrons consume fast food
with some, if imperfect, knowledge of the food's obesity-procuring
substances, notification of precise contents may not change the eating
decisions of most adult patrons. This is especially true upon considering
the implicit, albeit imprecise, notification function of "light" or "low
fat" menu items.
B. Model II: Duty of Notification Tailored to Fast Food Restaurants
Alternatively, Model II would mimic Model I, except limit the
NLEA exemption to fast food restaurants, rather than embody all
restaurants. To do so, the exemption stipulated in subsection
(q)(5)(A)(i) could be reconstructed so that it concluded with a new
phrase:
(i) which is served in restaurants or other establishments in
which food is served for immediate human consumption or
which is sold for sale or use in such establishments, provided
those restaurants or establishments do not, at any of their
individual locations or franchises, either (a) offer delivery of
food through drive-through windows; or (b) dispense food at
food courts in retail outlets including, but not limited to,
shopping malls, airports, and schools.
Therefore, concerns of diners and other non-fast food restaurants would
be allayed.
394. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i).
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A variation of Model II was recently proposed by U.S.
Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and U.S. Senator Tom Harkin
(D-IA). The Menu Education and Labeling Act395 ("MEAL") would
require that all chain restaurants 396 print the caloric, fat, and sodium
content of each menu item (thus requiring some of the listing
requirements proscribed by NLEA). Since all chain restaurants would
be affected, non-fast food restaurants such as Morton's Steak House and
Legal Seafoods would be statutorily included. Considering those
restaurants, like fast food restaurants, share identical operational
procedures as individual franchises, their inclusion may initially appear
desirable."l
On the other hand, unlike at fast food restaurants where meals are
prepared according to company-established procedure, non-fast food
restaurant chains employ chefs, and they offer cooking variations that
may affect the dish's ultimate nutritional content. To illustrate, consider
that the temperature and manner in which a steak is cooked can result in
significantly different nutritional content.39 Thus, by affecting these
non-fast food restaurants, MEAL may exceed the scope of suitable
notification and prove incompatible with accurate nutritional assessment
for consumers. Moreover, considering that most adult fast food patrons
consume such food with some, if imperfect, knowledge of its obesity-
procuring substances, proposals such as Model II or MEAL may
conceptually overreach.
C. Model III: Duty of Notification Tailored to Fast Food Aimed at
Children
Before contemplating Model III, it may prove judicious to reflect
upon certain analyses within this Article. To start, recall that fast food
companies focus their advertising resources on attracting young
customers. Considering that children, unlike adults, often lack the
requisite cognitive skills to weigh the short-term and particularly long-
term, consequences of consumption decisions, they are especially
receptive to these efforts. Perhaps, in part for that reason, the
percentage of children consuming fast food has surged rapidly over the
past twenty years, as has the proportion of children that are overweight.
While socioeconomic changes, such as diminished physical activity and
395. S. 2108, 108th Cong. (2004), H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
396. "Chain restaurants" are defined as restaurants with twenty or more
franchises. H.R. 3444 § 3.
397. For instance, individual franchises employ standard menus and employee
uniforms. For a discussion on shared practices, see Frumkin, supra note 173, at 1.
398. See Candy Sagon, Ask 6 Meat Mavens How to Cook the Perfect Steak and
You'll Get 7 Opinions, WASH. PosT, June 11, 1997, at El.
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fewer meals prepared at home, have contributed to aggregate weight
gain among children, augmented consumption of fast food has also
proven salient. Though the detriments of such weight gain are borne
most noticeably by obese children, taxpayers also suffer, particularly
since half of the costs of obesity represent public expenditures,399 and
four out of five children who become obese will remain so for the rest
of their lives. " Along those lines, since the food preferences of adults
are predominantly shaped by their eating habits as children, the
consumption choices of today's youth will impact future taxpayers, as
well as the allocation of public resources for much of the twenty-first
century. Therefore, illuminating the unique dynamics of fast food
consumption among children appears especially worthwhile, and perhaps
the most salient rationale for nutritional notification of any restaurant
food.
To accomplish this goal, Model III proposes that fast food
restaurants generate full nutritional disclosure for items aimed at young
children, that such disclosures utilize the NLEA format, and that it be
made available at the point-of-sale. Specifically, the exemption
stipulated in section 343(q)(5)(A)(i) of the NLEA to exclude only
restaurant meals aimed at a general audience would be amended to
conclude with a new phrase (in italics):
(i) which is served in restaurants or other establishments in
which food is served for immediate human consumption or
which is sold for sale or use in such establishments, provided
those restaurants or establishments do not, at any of their
individual locations or franchises, either (a) offer delivery of
food through drive-through windows; or (b) dispense food at
food courts in retail outlets including, but not limited to,
shopping malls, airports, and schools, and provided those
foods are not intended primarily for customers under the age
of 14.
To illustrate this concept, Model III would require nutritional disclosure
for many popular "kids menu" items, such as McDonald's "Happy
Meal" or Burger King's "Big Kids Meal," but not for such regular
menu items as McDonald's "Big Mac" or Burger King's "Whopper."
Quite simply, Model III would alert the parents of young patrons as
to the nutritional value of their menu choices. From a conceptual
standpoint, Model III would capitalize on three unique characteristics
inherent in this particular decision-making process, namely parents'
399. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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tendency to: (1) decide which items their young children will consume;
(2) choose "kids menu" items upon making a selection;" and (3) place
a significantly higher premium on nutrition and lower tolerance of risk
in that setting than when choosing items for themselves, older children,
or other adults. Thus, in the consumer choice paradigm, the disclosure
of nutritional content would likely affect the food "utility"
considerations of a parent selecting an item for her child, since in that
context, and perhaps only in that context, the relative value of
"nutrition" to "taste" is absolute and, as discussed extensively in Part I,
there exists considerable discrepancy between presumed and actual
caloric content of fast food items. At the same time, Model III avoids
the inefficiencies inherent in Models I and II-namely, the imposition of
unnecessary and cumbersome costs upon diners and other chain
restaurants. Similarly, by merely requiring nutritional labeling of fast
food companies, Model III would impose a relatively modest cost,
particularly when compared to more discriminatory and regressive
schemes, such as an obesity tax" or a tax on fast food.403
401. Although sales data suggest that parents of young children most often
choose items from "kids menus," it remains to be seen how the recent incorporation of
"dollar menus"-where, for instance, a McDonald's patron can purchase a double
cheeseburger for only ninety-nine cents-might affect the parental meal selection
process. Indeed, note the sharp price difference between the ninety-nine cents
cheeseburger and the $3.25 Happy Meal. If subsequent data reveals an increasing
parental tendency to select "adult" menu items for their children, then universal fast
food labeling should be more seriously considered and likely endorsed.
402. The "Fat Tax" concept has generated recent attention, especially in
Europe. For instance, the German Finance Minister, Hans Eichel, proposes that
overweight Germans pay more in taxes in order to relieve expanding health care costs.
See First Light, EDMONTON SUN, Sept. 11, 2004, at 2. In theory, such a tax could
require that overweight persons pay a tax or those of normal weight receive a refund.
Either way, taxpayers would observe unmistakable incentives to stay fit. However,
aside from myriad practical problems in auditing payment, as well as the sheer political
impossibility of a "fat tax," consider also its regressivity: as discussed in Part I.B, there
exists an inverse relationship between weight and socioeconomic status, meaning that
poorer Americans would likely bear a disproportionate burden of any "fat tax." Supra
Part I.B. Equally important, as discussed in Part IV.B, obesity can be triggered by a
number of factors, including ascribed characteristics such as genetic predisposition or
slow metabolism. Supra Part IV.B. Thus, for some, taxing one's weight could be the
equivalent of taxing one's race or age. To cement the incongruity of this idea, consider
that forty-three out of the fifty baseball players who played in the 2004 World Series
were technically overweight, and could thus be eligible to pay a "fat tax." See Heavy
Hitters: Forty-Three Out of 50 World Series Players Are Considered Overweight by
Federal Government, Oct. 27, 2004, PR NEWSWIRE, LEXIS, News & Business, Wire
Service Stories, Bus. WIRE.
403. Unlike a "fat tax," a "fast food tax" has proven attractive to at least a
handful of American legislators. For instance, in 2003, New York Assemblyman Felix
Ortiz proposed a 0.25% sales tax on fast food items. See Marguerite Higgins, Food
Fight, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at Al. At first glance, a fast food tax seems
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Aside from its conceptual advantages as applied to the consumer
choice theory, as well as its advancement of meaningful public policy
objectives, Model III can diffuse the desirability of the most plausible
obesity-related class actions, which would involve young children suing
fast food companies for failing to warn them of the dangers of
overconsumption. Indeed, nutritional notification would put the parents
on notice, and since they tend to select items for their children, it would
raise the specter that they are better positioned than fast food companies
to warn against the dangers of overconsumption. For that reason,
Model III would propose immunity for fast food companies from such
lawsuits. Therefore, while Model III would compel material and
precisely tailored changes upon fast food companies in their delivery of
food, it would offer them a corresponding indemnity from further and
costly litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
At first glance, it may appear slightly absurd to burden fast food
companies with the legal duty to notify individuals, young or old, that
fast food consumption may harm their health. Moreover, a duty to warn
cannot ameliorate social phenomena and public policy preferences that
have exacerbated obesity, particularly among youth. As explored in this
Article, children increasingly spend time partaking in indoor, sedentary
activities at the expense of outdoor, physical exertion. This trend is
promising, as it would presumably encourage moderated consumption of fast food-thus
sharing the same goal of nutritional disclosure. Nevertheless, taxes on food are perhaps
the most regressive of all consumption taxes, since lower-income families spend a
proportionately higher amount of their income on food. See Aaron Schwabach, How
Free Trade Can Slave the Everglades, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 301, 311 (2001).
Though a "fast food tax" would only discourage consumption of one type of food,
consider that fast food prices are uniquely low, and unless such a tax would actually
procure moderated consumption, it would likely raise the overall cost of family food
purchases, either by encouraging consumption of more expensive substitutes, such as
grocery products or restaurant dishes, or simply forcing families to absorb a higher cost
for similar portions of fast food. The latter, and troubling, scenario seems more
plausible when considering that families in lower-income neighborhoods frequently lack
access to supermarkets, thus often regarding fast food as the most viable meal option.
See supra Part IV.A. Regardless of how a "fast food tax" would modify their eating
habits, those with the fewest resources would likely bear the greatest burden. Lastly,
note how a "fast food tax" philosophically contrasts with nutritional disclosure: the
former assumes that individuals cannot effectively utilize the latter. Indeed, while
nutritional disclosure informs the consumer of the food's content, a "fast food tax"
simply penalizes consumption, presupposing that individuals lack the capacity to process
information. Though it is unclear which reform would best promote moderated
consumption, "fast food taxes" have generated scant support and are not likely to secure
passage in the near future.
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only complicated by the diminishing presence of physical education in
American schools. Similarly significant, fewer meals are eaten at home,
principally because American parents work more days and longer hours
than before, a development that discourages food preparation and
leisurely dining. In other words, the overconsumption of fast food is
merely one of many contributors to the obesity epidemic in America,
and using legal theory to address it should be viewed in that limited
light.
Likewise, objective analysis of nutritional labeling must also
account for local constraints and resulting choices that have engendered
opportunities for the overconsumption of fast food. For instance,
consider that numerous public school committees have opted to lease
school property to fast food companies, thus providing unfettered access
to these companies' most coveted customers. Perhaps these school
committees did so only after local taxpayers refused to augment school
budgets, though such a premise would then beg the question of why
taxpayers would choose lower taxes at the expense of their children's
health. Alternatively, consider that most state governments have
declined programs that would enhance children's awareness of the long-
term consequences of obesity and overconsumption.
Aside from recognizing social phenomena and public choices that
have enabled the growth of obesity, the optimization of nutritional
labeling should also contemplate whether consumers might learn more if
companies possessed market incentives, rather than regulatory duties, to
provide the clearest nutritional information and in the most illuminating
format. Specifically, consider that voluntary agreements have been
associated with efficient transmission of data, particularly since they
internalize unique circumstances and absorb market variances among
industry participants. Moreover, a free market approach has already
indicated a certain degree of voluntary fungibility on the part of the fast
food industry, most notably evidenced by its introduction of "light
menu" items as well as its posting of nutritional information on company
websites.
On the other hand, voluntary agreements and market incentives
have failed to create sufficient communication of dietary choices. Quite
simply, collaborative projects between the fast food industry and
governmental actors have been rendered deficient due to the absence of
deterrence. Similarly, while light menus and online nutritional
information supply advisement, they tend to do so in imprecisely
implicit or incomplete, often obtuse, formats. Perhaps the failure of the
free market to encourage optimal sharing of information is best
evidenced by the absence of point-of-sale disclosure, the most effective
method to convey nutritional information.
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In light of these market defaults, contemplation of standardized
nutritional disclosure appears desirable. This is particularly true since
fast food patrons significantly underestimate the negative contents of
their menu selections, a troubling finding given that consumption of fast
food and rates of obesity have ascended over the last two decades.
Perhaps more concerning, approximately half of the cost of obesity is
borne by taxpayers, thus siphoning considerable public resources from
other endeavors.
Along these lines, the recent wave of proposed legislation to
enhance nutritional notification may reflect greater societal interest in
improving dietary consumption and reducing obesity. However, these
proposals largely ignore concepts of efficiency and effective
communication of consumer choice. Specifically, a blanket imposition
of nutritional labeling upon all restaurant and fast food items would
ignore varying degrees of effectiveness, as well as the inherent cost-to-
benefit ratios of different methods of labeling. Indeed, consumer choice
theory suggests that most fast food patrons would markedly discount or
disregard such information, since they place an exceedingly high
premium on taste, while internalizing little value in nutrition.
Therefore, in the context of adult fast food patrons, nutritional
disclosure would likely yield minimal impact on aggregate fast food
consumption, and thus fail to affect desirable public policy. Moreover,
economic models predict that universal labeling requirements would
needlessly burden certain types of diners and medium and high-end
restaurants.
In contrast, a targeted approach to nutritional labeling can manifest
functionality and precision. As explored in Model III, the consequences
of nutritional disclosure limited to children's fast food items appear
uniquely efficacious. This is true since parents tend to decide which
items their young children will consume, they place an anomalously
high premium on nutrition and avoidance of risk in contemplating that
choice, and they tend to significantly underestimate the caloric content
of fast food items. Thus, in the consumer choice paradigm, the
disclosure of such nutritional content would reconfigure the food
"utility" of various options for children, since in this setting the value of
"nutrition" considerably exceeds that of "taste." In short, consumer
choice theory predicts that nutritional disclosure for children's fast food
items would prove uncommonly meaningful.
Coupled with this finding, since nutritional notification would put
parents on notice as to the contents of children's consumption choices
and since they tend to select items for their children, they would be
optimally positioned to warn against the dangers of overconsumption.
For that reason, corresponding immunity for fast food restaurants from
obesity-related lawsuits would likewise prove conceptually sound.
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Nevertheless, as a possible nuance to this proposal, should growing
price discrepancies between cheaper, "adult" menu items and more
expensive, "kids" menu items reveal an increasing parental tendency to
select adult items for their children, then universal labeling for fast food
items should receive more serious consideration, and likely promotion.
By itself, targeted nutritional disclosure will not prompt a healthier
America, and it should only be considered as part of a broader,
antiobesity campaign. That is, better dieting, exercising, education, and
public policy choices all must play a vital role in curbing obesity, and
likewise, in reducing the taxpayers' burden caused by obese Americans.
However, targeted nutritional disclosure of children's fast food items
would play a principal, if not indispensable, role in truncating childhood
obesity simply because it would procure a unique, if not anomalous,
behavioral consequence that would considerably improve the eating
habits of many children. Equally important, unlike more discriminatory
and regressive proposals, such as an obesity tax or a fast food tax,
targeted nutritional disclosure would only impose the modest cost of
labeling, and only on the fast food industry. Plus, considering that four
out of five children maintain their eating habits for the remainder of
their lives, perhaps such disclosure may even create the first national
diet that won't be broken.
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